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MONOPOLIES AND THE CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF CRONY CAPITALISM
By Steven G. Calabresi 1 & Larissa Price 2

ABSTRACT: This article explores the right of the people to be free from government
granted monopolies or from what we would today call “Crony Capitalism.” We trace the
constitutional history of this right from Tudor England down to present day state and federal
constitutional law. We begin with Darcy v. Allen (also known as the Case of Monopolies
decided in 1603) and the Statute of Monopolies of 1624, both of which prohibited English Kings
and Queens from granting monopolies. We then show how the American colonists relied on
English rights to be free from government granted monopolies during the Revolutionary War
period as, for example, when American colonists protested against the East India Company’s
trade monopoly by holding the Boston Tea Party. We show that hatred of trade monopolies led
in part to the American Revolution. During the drafting and debates on the federal Constitution,
Thomas Jefferson and George Mason, as well as several Antifederalists, expressed grave
concern about government grants of monopoly power. The new federal government was thus
only given the enumerated power to create monopolies in the patent and copyright areas, and the
Framers at Philadelphia deliberately chose not to give Congress the power to charter
corporations which might be used to grant monopolies. During the Jacksonian era, it was a
hatred of government grants of monopoly that helped to lead to President Jackson’s killing of the
federally incorporated Bank of the United States. The same sentiment led as well to the Supreme
Court’s narrowing of the Contract Clause in the Charles River Bridge case. Many state laws
were struck down during the Jacksonian era for being monopolies, class laws, or grants of
special privilege. By the 1850s, the Abolitionists themselves had begun to borrow the
antimonopoly idea to argue that slavery was a constitutionally forbidden monopoly by slave
owners of the labor of African Americans. By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, the Reconstruction Congress was firmly opposed to all forms of class legislation, grants
of special privilege, or of monopoly. Concerns about the evils of government granted monopolies
were thus central to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We argue that
Americans have a constitutional right to be free from government grants of monopoly and other
forms of class legislation because of: 1) the rich English and American colonial history with
respect to the right to be free from monopolies; 2) the state constitutional law bans on
monopolies, class legislation, and special grants of privilege; 3) the limiting of federal
enumerated power to grant monopolies to the patent and copyright context; and 4) the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think that the Slaughter-House Cases were wrongly
decided, and we argue against rational basis review in economic liberties cases. We provide
historical and legal arguments that defend the classical liberalism of John Tomasi in his new
book defending economic liberty, Free Market Fairness.
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Government-conferred monopolies granted by English Kings and Queens plagued
England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, leading to both the Case of
Monopolies and a parliamentary Statute of Monopolies. While today the word “monopoly” is
generally used to refer to the private accumulation of economic power, this is not the meaning
that was originally attached to the term. The original meaning of the word “monopoly” was an
exclusive grant of power from the government—in the form of a “license” or “patent”—to work
in a particular trade or to sell a specific good. The word “monopoly” comes from the Greek
roots “mono” meaning single or one and “polein” meaning to sell 3 The Greek word
“monopolion” referred to an exclusive legal right of sale issued by the government. Sir Edward
Coke defined monopolies in the early 1600’s as being:
Institution[s] or allowance[s] by the King by his grant, commission, or otherwise
to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, of or for the sole buying,
selling, making, working or using of anything whereby any person or persons,
bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrainted of any freedom or liberty
that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade. 4
Samuel Johnson’s dictionaries from the eighteenth century defined a monopoly as “the
exclusive privilege of selling anything.” 5 The 1828 First Edition of Noah Webster’s
American Dictionary of the English Language defined a monopoly as being:
The sole power of vending any species of goods, obtained either by engrossing
the articles in market by purchase, or by a license from the government
confirming this privilege. Thus the East India Company in Great Britain has a
monopoly of the trade to the East Indies, granted to them by charter. Monopolies
by individuals obtained by engrossing, are an offense prohibited by law. But a
man has by natural right the exclusive power of vending his own produce or
manufactures, and to retain that exclusive right is not a monopoly within the
meaning of the law. 6
3

THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 674 (Robert K. Barnhart ed. 1988).
EDWARD COKE, THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 181 (1664).
5
See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. revised 1768); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (3d ed.1766).
6
NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).
4

The American colonists shared English concerns about exclusive monopoly privileges
issued by the government, which imposed enormous costs on the general public and especially
on consumers. George Mason, Thomas Jefferson, and several Antifederalists argued in favor of
including an antimonopoly clause in the federal Constitution. Although no such clause was
added at the federal level, constitutional drafters in two states recognized the danger of
monopolies and prohibited government granted monopolies in their state constitutions. More
states added antimonopoly clauses to their state constitutions in the first one hundred years after
the federal constitution was adopted. Others prohibited monopolies using different language,
including clauses that forbade the giving of exclusive privileges to one class of citizens over
another, or clauses that forbade the abridging of the privileges or immunities of citizens. The
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution shared this concern with what
they called class legislation, a concern which led four U.S. Supreme Court justices to say that
state granted monopolies were unconstitutional in an important dissent in 1873 in The SlaughterHouse Cases. 7
The objection to government granted monopolies and to forms of caste or class
legislation is not only part of this country’s history: it is also relevant today. In a recent op-ed in
the Washington Post, George Will describes a legal challenge that has just been brought to the
constitutionality of a monopoly granted by the state of Washington to a ferry boat company. 8
The ferry boat company has a legal monopoly on boat service to a town that can otherwise only
be reached by plane. The challengers to the Washington state law setting up the monopoly are
residents of that remote town who wish to open a competing boat service to provide an easier

7

83 U.S. 36 (1873).
George Will, Testing the Waters of Economic Liberty, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2011, available at
http://patriotpost.us/opinion/george-will/2011/12/18/testing-the-waters-of-economic-liberty/.
8

way to get to their town. As George Will explains, the problem of government conferred
monopolies is not unique to one town in Washington state because it is now routine in many
states for the government to require licenses for various industries, often for the purpose of
bestowing economic favors. Licensing requirements of this kind sometimes take the form of a
complete prohibition (as is the case in Washington state) or they at other times serve as a barrier
to entry for many industries, thus preventing or reducing competition. Licensing requirements in
this country today are nothing short of remarkable. 9 Many local and state governments license
businesses for no legitimate health or safety reasons. For example, tourist guides, funeral
attendants, and florists are all sometimes licensed professionals even though there is no
legitimate public health or safety reason for such laws. 10
Local public schools provide yet another example of a situation where there is a
government sponsored monopoly provider of public services. Like most monopoly providers,
many public schools provide poor service to their consumers (parents and children), while
diverting monopoly rents in the form of bloated salaries and benefits to the providers of
education (bureaucrats and teachers’ unions). Most Americans feel they have to send their
children to public schools since they are taxed to pay for public schools even if they choose to
send their children to private schools or to home-school them. 11 The public school monopoly is
especially objectionable because it interferes with parental control over the raising and education
of ones own children. 12

9

Chip Mellor & Dick Carpenter, Want Jobs? Cut Local Regulations, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 28, 2011,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304911104576443881925941712.html.
10
Id.
11
The public school monopoly is discussed further in a forthcoming working paper by Steven G. Calabresi and Abe
Salander entitled “Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why School Vouchers are Constitutionally Required.”
12
Id.

Ever since the New Deal, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the very deferential
rational basis test in reviewing the constitutionality of federal and state economic regulations
including those that grant monopoly status. Such laws are rarely challenged and even more
rarely struck down. We think this is a mistake. 13

We think the post New Deal caselaw on

economic liberties, epitomized by Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., is wrongly decided and that the
right to be free from class legislation, monopolies, and grants of special privilege is deeply
rooted in this nation’s history and traditions. We therefore think this right is embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that it can only be trumped by just laws
enacted for the good of the whole people. 14 We think George Will is right when he denounces
government licensing schemes because they “lack[] constitutional warrant and repudiate[] the
nation’s foundational philosophy” and because they require entrepreneurs to

“approach

government on bended knee to beg it to confer upon them a right—the right to compete.” 15
We also agree with John Tomasi’s new book, Free Market Fairness, which argues that
economic liberties are just as important to freedom as are all of the other liberties embraced by
classical liberals. 16

We think that this law review article helps to spell out the legal

underpinnings and history of the economic liberties that Tomasi identifies, and we view our
analysis and Tomasi’s as being in harmony and as being mutually reinforcing. Tomasi defends
economic liberty from the perspective of political philosophy to which we seek here to add the
perspective of history and law.
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Steven G. Calabresi & Julia Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011); Melissa
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997).
14
6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3230 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823).
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George Will, Testing the Waters of Economic Liberty, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2011, available at
http://patriotpost.us/opinion/george-will/2011/12/18/testing-the-waters-of-economic-liberty/.
16
JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS (2012).

Part I of this paper discusses the English legal history with respect to government
licensed monopolies in the Seventeenth Century and the landmark events for limiting the King’s
power to grant monopoles—the Case of Monopolies and Statute of Monopolies. Part I also
discusses the spread of the English concern with government grants of monopoly to the
American colonies, and it discusses the role monopolies in trade played in colonial America in
building support for the American Revolution. Part II discusses the effort by some of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution to obtain an anti-monopoly clause in the federal Constitution,
an effort which ultimately failed. Part II shows how anti-monopoly ideas infused themselves
into the Supreme Court’s early Contracts Clause caselaw and the central role they played in the
emergence of the Fourteenth Amendment as a ban on class or caste based legislation. Part II also
discusses the connection between the various federal antitrust laws and government-granted
monopolies. Part III discusses the adoption of antimonopoly clauses in state constitutions,
beginning at the Founding and continuing through the early twentieth century. Part III also
considers the move toward general laws governing incorporation for corporations and away from
special legislative charter grants. Part III also surveys how the monopoly concept came in some
states to reflect a concern with private economic power, and it also surveys state cases which
apply state antimonopoly provisions. We conclude with a few parting words about the decline in
concern for the protection of economic liberty in modern American constitutional law.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY: HOW MONOPOLIES CAME TO BE HATED
A.

The English Experience with Monopolies

The English hatred of monopolies dates back to the reigns of Queen Elizabeth I and King
James I. Two principal events—one coming from the common law courts and the other coming
from Parliament—show the strong disapproval of government monopolies in early Seventeenth

Century England. The first such event is a case, Darcy v. Allen (commonly known as the Case
of Monopolies), which was decided in 1601. In this case, a common law court reviewed a royal
grant of trade privileges and struck down the grant as being void under the common law. 17 The
second key event is the passage in 1624 of the Statute of Monopolies, which was the result of
years of pressure by the House of Commons to prohibit the King or Queen from granting the
same kinds of monopoly privileges as those that had been struck down in Darcy. 18 These two
events mark a time when intellectuals and lawyers began to truly recognize the right of
Englishmen to work for a living and to compete with each other without interference from
government grants of special economic privilege. 19
1.

Darcy v. Allen

During Queen Elizabeth’s very long reign she oftentimes found herself in need of more
money than Parliament had appropriated for her to use. As a result, she sometimes tried to
supplement her subsidy from Parliament by selling royal monopolies. 20 This practice was
criticized by some in Parliament because it imposed a burden on subjects in addition to the
burden they already bore in paying taxes. A royal grant of monopoly privileges meant that
subjects suffered a loss of jobs, since some people were shut out of their trades, and consumers
had to pay higher prices since the existence of legal monopolies drove up the price of goods. 21
For instance, in a speech at Parliament in 1571, Robert Bell said that “the People were galled by

17

77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures thereof (Statute of
Monopolies), 21 Jam., c. 3 (1624).
19
TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 17 (2010).
20
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1328
(2005).
21
Id. at 1328.
18

two means . . . . [B]y Licences a few only were enriched, and the multitude impoverished.” 22
As Adam Smith later described in Wealth of Nations, the punishment for violating grants of
monopoly privileges was sometimes severe. Smith wrote that:
Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood . . . the
exporter of sheep, lamps, or rams, was for the first offence to forfeit all his goods
for ever, to suffer a year’s imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in
a market town upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second
offense to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. 23
Queen Elizabeth’s response to complaints about the monopolies she was granting was at first
entirely dismissive. She thus said: “We are to let you understand, her Majesty's pleasure in that
behalf that her Prerogative Royall may not be called in question for the valliditie of the letters
patents.” 24
Opposition in Parliament to exclusive trade privileges continued in 1597 when a note was
sent to Queen Elizabeth I requesting that she stop the practice of granting royal monopolies. 25
Parliament’s note to the Queen gently requested, “her Highness[‘s] most gracious care and
favour, in the repressing of sundry inconveniences and abuses practiced by Monopolies and
Patents of priviledge.” 26 In addition, at the end of the ninth parliament the Speaker mentioned
the issue of monopolies in his closing speech, which was unusual because presentation of the
Queen’s subsidy customarily took place during the final speech. 27 In response, Queen Elizabeth

22

Id. (quoting SIMONDS D’EWES, A COMPLEAT JOURNAL OF THE VOTES, SPEECHES AND DEBATES, BOTH OF THE
HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH OF GLORIOUS
MEMORY 158 (Scholarly Resources 1974) (1693)).
23
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700–01 (Edwin
Cannan, ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776).
24
Adam Mosoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
1255, 1264–65 (2001) (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 863 (1994)).
25
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1329-30
(2005) (quoting SIMONDS D’EWES, A COMPLEAT JOURNAL OF THE VOTES, SPEECHES AND DEBATES, BOTH OF THE
HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH OF GLORIOUS
MEMORY 553 (Scholarly Resources 1974) (1693)).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 1329.

asked Parliament to let her continue the practice. But, at the same time, the Queen seemed to
acknowledge that Parliament had power to regulate with respect to her prerogative power to
grant monopolies—a clear weakening of her earlier position:
[H]er Majesty hoped that her dutiful and loving Subjects would not take away her
Prerogative, which is the chiefest Flower in her Garden, and the principal and
head Pearl in her Crown and Diadem; but that they will rather leave that to her
Disposition. And as her Majesty hath proceeded to Trial of them already, so she
promiseth to continue, that they shall all be examined, to abide the Trial and true
Touchstone of the Law. 28
However, it became clear that Queen Elizabeth had no intention of carrying through with
her promise to regulate the distribution and functioning of royal monopolies, despite her apparent
recognition that Parliament had power in this area. So, in 1601, the topic of royal power to grant
monopolies was again heavily debated in Parliament, and as a result, a draft bill to outlaw royal
monopolies was introduced. 29 But before a decision was made with regard to the draft bill,
Queen Elizabeth offered Parliament a compromise. Traditionally cases regarding the royal
monopolies could only be heard by the Court of Star Chamber, a fortress of royal power in which
the common law of England did not apply. Queen Elizabeth proposed as a compromise to both
cancel some of the least popular monopolies she had granted and, most importantly, to allow
new cases involving the legality of monopolies to be heard in a common law court. 30
The result of this compromise was the famous 1603 case of Darcy v. Allen, often called
The Case of the Monopolies. Interestingly, Darcy itself involved not a challenge to the legality
of royal monopolies, but rather was brought by a monopoly-holder to protect his privilege. The
suit was brought by Edward Darcy in 1602 who claimed that Thomas Allen infringed on his

28

4 Parl. Hist. Eng. 420 (Feb. 9, 1598)); see also Chris Dent, “Generally Inconvenient”: The 1624 Statute of
Monopolies as Political Compromise, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 415, 425–26 (2009).
29
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1331
(2005).
30
Id.

monopoly right (through a royal patent granted by Queen Elizabeth) to produce, import, and sell
all trading cards in England. The court held that the patent was void under the common law. 31
Yet there was no published judicial opinion of the case, in the modern sense, because in
seventeenth century England and for many years thereafter, English judges delivered their
opinions in cases orally from the bench. 32 And unless a private reporter wrote down and
published what the judges said, the case law precedent would be lost.
Luckily, Sir Edward Coke, the most famous lawyer of his day, did write up a report on
Darcy v. Allen, which has been very influential. 33 Coke interestingly represented Darcy in the
case since Coke was the Attorney General and was bound to defend the legality of the monopoly
that was being challenged there. Coke’s report, which was written an entire twelve years after
the case was decided, describes the common law court’s rationale as a strong statement about the
importance of open and free trade. According to Coke’s report, the court struck down the royal
monopoly because allowing people to work in their respective trades was not only beneficial for
them, but was also necessary for the well-being of the whole country:
All Trades . . . which avoid idleness . . . and exercise men and youths in labor for
the maintenance of them and their Families, and for the increase of their livings,
to serve the Queen if need be were profitable for the Commonwealth; and
therefore the grant to the Plaintiff to have the sole making of them is against the
Common Law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject. 34
And while the financial benefits were important, Coke’s report suggests the case was as much a
statement about the negative consequences of exclusive trade privileges as it was about the
31

Darcy v. Allen, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1325 (1996).
33
See id. at 1262 (describing Coke’s report as “exceptionally durable”). As Corré points out, Darcy v. Allen has
been cited in modern English cases. Id. (citing Nyali, Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., (1956) 1 Q.B. 1, (1955) 1 All ER 646).
As will be discussed later herein, Darcy was also very influential in the pleadings in The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83
U.S. 36 (1872). Although Darcy involved the grant of monopoly by the state, it has also proved influential in the
antitrust context in the United States. Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45
EMORY L.J. 1261, 1262 (1996) (citing City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 386 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
34
Darcy v. Allen, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 86a 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
32

individual right to economic liberty. In fact, it was critical to have the freedom to pursue one’s
livelihood—“That every mans Trade doth maintains his life, and therefore he ought not to be
deprived or dispossessed of it, no more than of his life.” 35
Coke’s report of the case discussed the many problems with monopolies and in particular
the ways in which monopolies diminish wealth. First, monopolies serve only the interests of
those who are granted the monopoly:
The sole Trade of any Mechanical Artifice, or any other Monopoly is not only a
damage and prejudice to those who exercise the same Trade, but also to all other
subjects, for the end of all these Monopolies is for the private gain of the
Patentees; and although provisions and cautions be added to moderate them; yet .
. . it is meer folly to think that there is any measure in mischief or wickedness. 36
More specifically, Coke discusses the effects trade privileges have on people who wish to enter a
trade but who are prohibited from doing so because a royal monopoly gave an exclusive right to
practice the trade to someone else:
This [leads] to the impoverishing of divers Artificers and others, who before by
labor of their hands in their Art or Trade had kept themselves and their families,
who now of necessity shall be constrained to live in idlenesse and beggary. 37
Further, but perhaps secondarily in Coke’s mind and for others during the era, monopolies hurt
the entire public because monopolies lead to higher prices and poorer quality goods and services:
That the price of the said commodity shall be raised, for he who hath the sole
selling of any commodity, may make the price as he pleaseth. . . That after a
Monopoly [has been] granted, the Commodity is not so good and merchantable as
it was before; for the patentee having the sole trade, regardeth only his private,
and not the publicke weale. 38
It is important to note that Coke’s report in the Case of the Monopolies has been
challenged by some scholars who accuse Coke of exaggerating the free trade stance of the

35

Id. at 87a (emphasis added).
Id. at 86b.
37
Id.
38
Id.
36

common law. 39 The primary evidence that Coke’s report of the case was an exaggeration is that
Kings and Queens continued to issue monopoly royal patents for many years after Darcy v. Allen
was decided. Queen Elizabeth died the year Darcy was decided and King James I took the
throne. James I was not nearly as well-liked in Parliament as Queen Elizabeth had been, which
did not bode well for his ability to receive subsidies. 40 Unlike Queen Elizabeth, King James I
pursued a more aggressive and costly foreign policy, and he failed totally to exercise fiscal
conservatism, spending lots of money on entertaining and on promoting his favorites who tended
to be handsome young men. 41 Because of King James I’s extensive military engagements, his
inability to control spending, and his poor relationship with Parliament, the new King found
himself extensively using his powers to issue royal patents in order to raise money. 42
Since King James I continued to issue monopoly royal trade privileges, the House of
Commons again pushed for adoption of a law to prohibit the King from granting monopolies.
Although King James resisted, some signs of change began to appear. For example, in 1610
James issued his Book of Bounty, in which he stated that exclusive trade privileges were contrary
to the common law and his own policies, that he intended to discontinue the privileges, and that
he promised not to entertain any new suitors regarding monopolies. 43
Despite the Book of Bounty, however, James continued to issue monopolies.

For

example, in 1615 Sir Edward Coke, who was by then the Lord Chief Justice of England, struck
down a guild incorporated under a charter, relying on Darcy. 44 This apparently came as no

39

See, e.g., Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1325
(1996); Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1332
(2005).
40
Id. at 1342-43.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1344–45.
43
Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1324 (1996);
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1345 (2005).
44
The Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 12 Jam. 1 (1614).

surprise to Parliament. As one member of Parliament quipped, “Yet, as in a Garden, clean
weeded, Weeds next Year; so here, by new Patents, Proclamation.” 45 As a result, King James’s
relationship with Parliament continued to worsen, and the King dissolved Parliament whenever
there was a disagreement. Not surprisingly, Parliament decided in 1614 to discontinue King
James’s subsidy until resolutions regarding the granting of monopolies and impositions (royal
import duties imposed in addition to duties on tonnage and poundage) were reached. 46
These events after Darcy v. Allen was decided raise a question about what we should
make of Sir Edward Coke’s report of the famous case. At least one scholar argues that at the
time Coke published his report of Darcy v. Allen in 1615, his view on the royal patent power was
no longer as controversial, and perhaps his views on the court’s rationale evolved as a result of
events in the twelve years between the case and his published report. 47 Further, even accepting
as true that Coke’s report of the Darcy v. Allen was exaggerated (which cannot be known for
sure since there is no official published opinion), Sir Edward Coke’s report has been described as
“exceptionally durable” and has been cited as good law for centuries in both England and the
United States, including in some modern case law. 48 Sir Edward Coke’s views on monopolies
were also not unique to him—similar arguments were made at the same time in the House of
Commons. As previously mentioned, Robert Bell said in Parliament at this time that “the People
were galled by two means . . . . [B]y Licences a few only were enriched, and the multitude
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Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, n. 148
(2005).
46
Id. at 1345–46.
47
Id. at 1266, 1324–25.
48
Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1325 (1996)
(citing Nyali, Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., (1956) 1 Q.B. 1, (1955) 1 All ER 646). As will be discussed later herein, Darcy
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impoverished.” 49 Thus, even if Coke’s report of the case itself was an exaggeration, Coke’s
rationale and reasoning were subsequently widely agreed to. As will be discussed later herein, it
was Sir Edward Coke’s report of the case of the monopolies—and no other report—that
influenced some of the Founding Fathers, the Anti-Federalists, and the American state
governments when they adopted or amended their own constitutions. Thus, even if Coke’s views
were idiosyncratic or wrong about the law of England, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution took
them as being true. Founding generation Americans then might very well have believed there
was an ancient English constitutional right to be free of monopolies.
2.

The Statute of Monopolies

By 1614 the relationship between the King and Parliament had significantly deteriorated,
an important precursor to the English Revolution which would begin in the 1640’s. King James
I abused the royal prerogative and dissolved his first two Parliaments, leading Parliament to
refuse to give James a royal subsidy. Without such a subsidy, the King was forced to find other
sources of revenue. He turned in large part to the granting of monopoly royal trade privileges,
but in the process the entire system of the granting of such privileges broke down:
Patents were granted, routinely revoked . . . and re-issued to someone else.
Eventually, revocation became so common that patents being issued included
language permitting revocation by vote of the Privy Council. Increasingly
desperate for revenue, James granted broad supervisory control over whole
industries and with it broad powers to search and arrest infringers. These powers
were predictably subject to frequent and profound abuse by the patentees, who
were commonly unpopular favorites of James . . . further fomenting public scorn
for both the monopolies and the monopolists. The administrative mechanism for
controlling the patents having broken down, their use was completely unmanaged.
The patents were economically burdensome and politically unpopular, but their

49

“The People were galled by two means . . . . [B]y Licences a few only were enriched, and the multitude
impoverished.” Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313,
1328 (2005) (quoting SIMONDS D’EWES, A COMPLEAT JOURNAL OF THE VOTES, SPEECHES AND DEBATES, BOTH OF
THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH OF
GLORIOUS MEMORY 158 (Scholarly Resources 1974) (1693)).

use was so poorly administered that James received very little of the economic
rents they generated. 50
King James I called his third Parliament in 1621, at which point the issue of royally
granted monopolies was the first item on the agenda in the House of Commons. This was in part
attributed to a severe economic depression at that time, even though the monopolies themselves
did not appear to be the primary cause of the depression. 51 The House of Commons established
a Committee of Grievances, with Sir Edward Coke who was by then a Member of Parliament as
chairman.

Coke had been fired as Lord Chief Justice of England by King James for his

unwillingness to decide legal cases in the way the King wanted him to do.

He entered

Parliament as a foe to the King. By 1621, Coke was one of the most outspoken critics of royally
granted monopolies, and a draft bill banning monopolies was quickly reported in Parliament. 52
However, the draft bill banning monopolies did not pass the House of Lords at that time because
there was still concern among the Lords that the bill would be too much of a constraint on the
royal prerogative. In an effort to appease the House of Commons, King James issued yet another
proclamation cancelling some patents and submitting others to common law courts. 53 He also
later established a committee by royal proclamation which was to hear and to address grievances
regarding monopolies. 54

50

Id. at 1346 (citing HAROLD G. FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF
102 & n.45 (1947); WILLIAM HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY 29, 31–
32, & n.4 (1913)).
51
Chris Dent, “Generally Inconvenient”: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political Compromise, 33 MELB.
U. L. REV. 415, 430 (2009).
52
Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1346
(2005).
53
Id. at 1348.
54
Chris Dent, “Generally Inconvenient”: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political Compromise, 33 MELB.
U. L. REV. 415, n.163 (2009).
THE PATENT MONOPOLY

Between 1621 and 1624, debate over foreign policy consumed much of Parliament’s
time. 55 However, eventually a bill which became the Statute of Monopolies passed the House of
Commons with language that was largely the same as that in the 1621 bill. 56 When the bill
reached the House of Lords, the Lords proposed a number of exceptions to the general
prohibition on monopolies, such as exceptions for the granting of patents and for the chartering
of corporations. 57 Sir Edward Coke did not ultimately object to the exception for chartering
corporations, since he did not think the Statute of Monopolies applied to them. 58 Further,
Parliament wanted to maintain full employment, which the guilds (also exempted from the
Statute of Monopolies) and corporations were both thought to protect. 59

Parliament was

beholden to the guilds, and the guilds exerted an enormous amount of power at this time. 60 For
example, during the same term that Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, it also passed a
seemingly conflicting statute which permitted only free members of the Cheesemongers and
Tallow-chandlers guilds to purchase cheese and butter for resale in London. 61 It is also reported
that in order for the Statute of Monopolies to pass the House of Lords, it was necessary to alter
the act to include exceptions for glass making and for alum mines. 62
Guilds were not necessarily monopolies.

Historically, guilds had been fraternal

associations, which in this context were joined together by a shared craft or trade. However, by
obtaining patents or charters within the city in which they operated—which they generally were
55
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able to do—the guilds often gained monopoly control over their respective craft or trade.
Because English guilds held more sway with Parliament than with the Crown, the guilds sought
support from Parliament to protect them from the royally granted monopolies, which sometimes
conflicted with their control of a particular market. 63
The Statute of Monopolies, as incorporated by the House of Lords and approved by the
House of Commons in 1624, is strongly worded and is broad in scope, reaching all types of
royally granted monopolies. As New York Chancellor James Kent later described the law, it was
the “‘Magna Charta of British Industry,’ because it ‘contained a noble principle, and secured to
every subject unlimited freedom of action, provided he did not injury to others, nor violated
statute law.’” 64 In Section one it provides that:
[A]ll Monopolies, and all Commissions, Grants, Licences, Charters and Letters
Patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or granted, to any
Person or Persons, Bodies Politick or Corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole
Buying, Selling, Making, Working or Using of any Thing within this Realm, or
the Dominion of Wales . . . or of any other Monopolies, or of Power, Liberty or
Faculty, to dispense with any others, or to give Licence or Toleration to do, use or
exercise any Thing against the Tenor or Purport of any Law or Statute . . . and all
Proclamations, Inhibitions, Restraints, Warrants of Assistants, and all other
Matters and Things whatsoever, any way tending to the Instituting, Erecting,
Strengthening, Furthering or Countenancing of the same or any of them . . . are
altogether contrary to the Laws of this Realm, and so are and shall be utterly void
and of none Effect, and in no wise to be put in Use or Execution. 65
Section two makes it clear that litigation involving monopolies was subject to trial in the
common law courts. 66 Sections five and six of the Statute contain exceptions for invention
patents, which were subject to a time limit:
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[A]ny Declaration before-mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and
Grants of Privilege for the Term of fourteen Years or under, hereafter to be made,
of the sole Working or Making of any manner of new Manufactures within this
Realm, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which
others at the Time of Making such Letters Patents and Grants shall not use. 67
Interestingly, Section seven exempts grants of monopoly privileges by Parliament:
[T]his act or anything therein contained shall not in any wise extend or be
prejudicial to any grant or privilege, power, or authority whatsoever heretofore
made, granted, allowed, or confirmed by any act of parliament now in force, so
long as the same shall so continue in force. 68
As previously mentioned, Sections nine through fourteen provide exceptions for
corporations and specific patents. 69
James’s response to Parliament’s passage of the Statute of Monopolies was predictably
negative:
‘Touching my Patents in general, I am grieved that you have called them in and
condemned them upon so short examination. I confess I might have passed some
upon false suggestion and wrong information, but you are not to recall them
before they be examined by the judges . . . . Therefore I advise you to be careful,
that you have a good ground before you call for your patents, that you do not
defraud patentees . . . . I say to you when you judge of patents, hear patiently, say
not presently, it is against the law, for patents are not to be judged unlawful by
you.’ 70
Thus, again James questioned Parliament’s authority to enact the Statute, although he
“begrudgingly” assented to it.71 However, given James’s views it is perhaps unsurprising that
despite the Statute’s sweeping language, monopoly royal trade privileges continued to be granted
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well past King James I’s reign (which ended with his death in 1625) and through the reign of
King Charles I despite the fact King James I did not veto the Statute of Monopolies. 72
Parliament continued to complain about and to protest against royal monopolies after the
adoption of the Statute of Monopolies. For example, during the Long Parliament, which lasted
from 1640 until 1648, Parliament could only be dissolved by agreement of its members.
Monopolies were one of the main issues that confronted the Long Parliament, and one of the
most famous statements criticizing royal monopolies was made at this time:
They are a nest of wasps―a swarm of vermin which have overcrept the land.
Like the frogs of Egypt they have gotten possession of our dwellings, and we
have scarce a room free from them. They sup in our cup; they dip in our dish;
they sit by our fire. We find them in the dye-fat, wash-bowl, and powdering-tub.
They share with the butler in his box. They will not bait us a pin. We may not buy
our clothes without their brokage. These are the leeches that have sucked the
commonwealth so hard that it is almost hectical. 73
Eventually, Parliament was successful in cancelling some monopolies and in abolishing the
Court of Star Chamber in 1641, the primary court that had enforced and protected the royally
granted monopoly privileges. 74 The Statute of Monopolies came eventually to be seen as being a
declaration by Parliament of its authority to legislate against royally granted monopolies and as
expressing Parliament’s strong support for the common law courts. 75 Indeed, Parliament’s
exercise of power in opposing royal monopolies eventually led to the exertions of parliamentary
power which culminated in the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 which
took place just decades later. Parliament’s power to bind the King by making statutory law was
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confirmed for all time as a result of the adoption of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which
ended the King’s claim that he could ignore or alter statutory law. 76
In some sense the struggle over the Statute of Monopolies was as much a struggle over
political power as it was a statement about free trade since Section seven of the Statute made
monopolies issued by the Crown illegal but such monopolies when issued by Parliament were
still permitted. 77 King James I may only have assented to the Statute of Monopolies because
England by then was at war with Spain, making the King more willing to concede power to
Parliament in order to ensure funding for the impending war. In any event, the Statute received
the royal assent and so it became part of the supreme law of England.
The debate over monopolies should also be viewed during the late 1620’s in light of the
efforts of King James I’s son, King Charles I, to tax Englishmen without parliamentary approval.
King Charles I’s preferred way of doing this was to arrest wealthy individuals and then say he
would only release them in exchange for a forced loan. Parliament, led by Sir Edward Coke, was
outraged. As a result, a document called the Petition of Right was drafted and presented to
Charles I with all of Parliament attending, and Charles reluctantly agreed to the Petition of Right.
The belief of colonial Americans that they could not be taxed by an English parliament in which
they were not represented dates back in part to Parliament’s successful efforts in the 1620’s to
stop monopolies and to prevent the King from taxing his subjects without Parliament’s consent.
While the Statute of Monopolies was a big accomplishment from a constitutional
perspective, it had some serious shortcomings because of its various exceptions and because of
the fact that it reserved the power to grant monopolies to Parliament. Why did the Statute pass in
the form in which it did? First, as part of the lawmaking process, members of Parliament had to
76
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make compromises for the sake of political expediency. This necessitated the inclusion of
various exceptions for politically powerful special interest groups, such as the various guilds.
The guilds were leading advocates of the Statute of Monopolies because of the power it took
away from the Crown, and they thus had a huge influence on the drafting of the Statute. The
Guilds obviously did not support the Statute of Monopolies because it stood for free trade, but
because the Statute would help them economically by protecting the guilds from royal
monopolists.78 Second, the theoretical underpinnings for the benefits of free trade had not yet
been expounded by Adam Smith and other modern economists, and England was dominated by
mercantilism at the time the Statute of Monopolies was enacted. 79 Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations—the fundamental work in classical economics—was not published until 1776, over one
hundred and fifty years after the Statute of Monopolies was enacted. Britain’s free trade era did
not begin until the mid-nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, the negative effects of monopolies were recognized in the early Seventeenth
Century, and monopolies were in fact limited in post-Revolutionary England as compared to
what the situation had been under the Tudors and Stuarts. 80 The limits set on monopolies both in
the common law case law such as Darcy and in the Statute of Monopolies show an awareness of
the costs monopolies impose.

This concern with the evils of monopoly travelled with

Englishmen when they crossed the Atlantic Ocean to the settle in the New World.
B.

Colonial America

The North American colonists generally considered themselves Englishmen, and they
thus thought that English statutes and common law rights and privileges should extend to them
as they had applied to their English ancestors. In real life, however, this often did not happen,
78
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which was one of the many grievances expressed by the colonists around the time of the writing
of the Declaration of Independence:
[T]he respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England . . . [and]
they are entitled to the benefit of such English statutes as existed at the time of
their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respectively found to be
applicable to their several and local circumstances. 81
In practice, English statutes generally had to specify that they applied to the colonies in order for
the courts to find that they did so. 82

As for application of the common law to the colonists,

matters were complicated by the fact that the colonies’ interpretation of what was the “common
law” did not always correspond to England’s, and in any event, the common law in the North
American colonies varied according to local circumstances. Moreover, although some language
in the thirteen colonial charters suggested that the common law of England extended to the North
American colonies, it is unlikely that the King’s lawyers who drafted the charters meant to
extend full common law rights to the colonies. 83
The Statute of Monopolies did not state explicitly that it extended to the colonies, so it
did not apply, and common law precedents were of questionable application as well. 84 As a
result, the colonies enacted their own versions of the Statute of Monopolies in order to both grant
patents for economic development purposes and to place restrictions on when patents could be
granted. For example, Massachusetts’s 1641 Body of Liberty provided that, “No monopolies
shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions that are profitable to the
Countrie, and that for a short time.” 85 Connecticut passed a similar law in 1672. 86 Compared to
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the Statute of Monopolies, these acts have been described as “mainly declaratory” and the text of
these provisions were much less comprehensive. 87 The assembly was generally left to determine
on a case by case basis whether to grant a patent and under what terms. 88
It is essential to note that, if it were not for the Crown’s ability to grant royal charters, the
colonies themselves would not have existed.

All of the original thirteen colonies were

established through the grant of royal charters, by which the King established and empowered
their respective governments. However, it is the language in the charters which would later be
relied on by the colonists as their relationship with England deteriorated.

For instance,

Virginia’s charter of 1611–12 established an assembly to meet four times per year to create laws
“So always, as the same be not contrary to our Laws and Statutes of this our Realm of England . .
. .” 89 Colonial charters were similarly written in the other North American colonies.
On this point, it is important to recognize the influence of Sir Edward Coke, who may be
thought of as a hero for the colonies, especially the Puritans who settled in Massachusetts and
Connecticut. Discussing the colonists’ reliance on Coke for their understanding of the English
common law, Theodore Plunckett wrote in a 1926 law review article that the common law was
the “palladium of their civil liberties.” 90 Coke proclaimed in Bonham’s Case that the common
law governed parliamentary acts, 91 and the colonists repeatedly relied on Coke’s declaration in
Bonham’s Case to argue that the common law could be used by the colonies to oppose British
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regulations. 92 For example, the Massachusetts colony relied directly on Coke when King James
II abrogated their original colonial charter in 1684 and attempted to consolidate all the New
England colonies along with the colonies of New York and New Jersey in a so-called Dominion
of New England. This event “provoked an outspoken claim [of] independence” and Bostonians
were said to “hold forth a law book, & quote the Authority of the Lord Cook to Justifie their
setting up for themselves; pleading the possession of 60 years against the right of the Crown.”93
Sir Edward Coke’s name and authority were also used by James Otis in Paxton’s Case,
challenging the writs of assistance which provided general search warrants often in customs
cases. In fact, it is fair to say that Otis’s entire argument in Paxton’s Case relied upon Coke and
Bonham’s Case!
Another example of the hold that Sir Edward Coke had on the legal thinking of colonial
Americans came with the controversy over the Stamp Act of 1765. This Act taxed the colonists
without their consent, which elicited the complaint that the Act “violated ‘Magna Carta and the
natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore[,] according to Lord Coke[, was] null and void.’”94
Sam Adams expressed a similar view when he said that “whether Lord Coke has expressed it or
not . . . an act of parliament made against Magna Carta in violation of its essential parties, is
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void.” 95

As the royal Governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, complained, the

colonists took “advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against
Magna Carta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void.” 96 In addition to relying on
Bonham’s Case, when John Adams, writing under the pseudonym “Novanglus” in 1774 asserted
that Parliament had no authority over the colonies and that each was a separate realm under the
King with its own independent legislature, he started his analysis with an argument from Coke’ s
Institutes. 97
Thus, the American colonists, relying in part on Coke, believed that all the constitutional
protections of Englishmen applied to them—including the protections conferred by the Statute of
Monopolies and by Darcy v. Allen. 98 For example, William Penn, the founder of the Province of
Pennsylvania and a proponent of the idea that the rights of Englishmen extended to those in the
colonies, 99 wrote about the evil of monopolies and the harm they caused. In a section of a 1687
pamphlet called The Excellent Priviledge of Liberty & Property Being the Birth-Right of the
Free-Born Subjects of England, William Penn summarized the Statute of Monopolies and Darcy
v. Allen, writing that, “Generally all Monopolies are against the great charter because they are
against the Liberty and Freedom of the Subject, and against the Law of the Land.” 100 Thus,
Thomas Barnes is quite right when he says, “Beg the question as to what extent Coke fell in
95
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behind Citizen Sam—scores of others of our Founding Fathers had no doubt which side he was
on and none questioned the magnitude of the aid he gave them.” 101
England’s continued practice of issuing monopolies helped directly in causing the
American Revolution.

England enacted an extensive set of laws which granted English

merchants monopolies in colonial trade for a variety of markets—from manufactured goods to
all kinds of raw materials. By the late eighteenth century, black markets arose in the colonies as
a response to England’s mercantilist trade policy. As a result, the English mercantile laws were
enforced with great intrusiveness, which in turn had grave consequences for England’s
relationship with the American colonies. 102 For instance, although the main point of protest in
Boston over the Tea Act was taxation without representation, the Boston Tea Party was an act
against the British government and the East India Company, which had a monopoly over tea
importations to the colonies. The havoc wreaked by the English monopoly system on England’s
relationship with the American colonies cannot be overstated:
[T]he efforts of the English government, backed by English merchants and
manufacturers, to deny to the Americans the right to compete in foreign markets
and to secure the benefits of foreign competition was one of the most potent
causes of the American Revolution. The spirit of monopoly which had permeated
English business life for centuries and worked injury in so many ways now
wrought irreparable harm to the British Empire by bringing about the loss of
invaluable dominions and the irrevocable division of the English people. 103
Thus, the English experience with monopolies influenced colonial America in two ways.
First, some colonies adopted their own versions of the Statute of Monopolies since the English
Statute of Monopolies and common law were generally thought not to extend to the colonies.
Second, England’s monopolistic trade laws led to protest by the colonists and eventually the
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American Revolution, just as James I’s monopolies had so outraged Englishmen in Parliament in
the 1620’s and led to the English Civil War in the 1640’s. In both instances, complaints were
made about taxation without representation and in both instances monopolies were in part to
blame. King George III, like James I, imposed a double burden on his people by both taxing his
people directly and by indirectly taxing them through the issuance of royal monopolies. The
colonists were both taxed on imports, and they were made subject to British control over foreign
trade without representation in Parliament.
II.

MONOPOLIES IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

At the Founding

The evils of the English monopolies and their impact on the American colonists
guaranteed that that the right to be free from monopolies would draw attention in the drafting and
ratifying of the federal constitution.

Several of the Founders themselves, as well as the

Antifederalists, and the state ratifying conventions took the position that the U.S. Constitution
should have an anti-monopoly clause.
George Mason and Thomas Jefferson led the way in urging that the new U.S.
Constitution contain an anti-monopoly clause. George Mason’s concern about the evils of
monopoly coupled with the grants of power to Congress in the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause led him, in part, to refuse to sign the proposed Constitution after
the Philadelphia Convention. 104 Mason was concerned that the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause might be used to regulate navigation in favor of the northern and
eastern states by granting monopolies in trade:
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By requiring only a Majority to make all commercial and navigation Laws, the five
Southern States (whose Produce and Circumstances are totally different from that of the
eight Northern and Eastern States) will be ruined; [it] will enable the Merchants of the
Northern and Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant Freight, but to monopolize
the Purchase of the Commodities at their own Price, for many years: to the . . .
Impoverishment of the People: and the Danger is the greater, as the Gain on one Side will
be in Proportion to the Loss on the other. . . . Under their own Construction of the
general Clause . . . the Congress may grant Monopolies in Trade and Commerce. . . . 105
George Mason’s concern was not exactly far-fetched given that the English colonial government
had misused its powers over trade in precisely this way. Indeed, the English abuse of power is
similar to the federal government’s abuses of power in the nineteenth century; after 1861, the
newly ascendant Northern Republican party protected Northern manufacturing interests to the
disadvantage of the South with a policy of extremely high protectionist tariffs.
Thomas Jefferson also hated monopolies and thought that they should be constitutionally
banned. In a letter to James Madison, complaining about the lack of a Bill of Rights in the
proposed Constitution, Jefferson put the principle of freedom from government monopolies on a
par with the protection of all of the other rights now enshrined in the Bill of Rights such as the
freedom of speech and of religion:
I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing
clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the
press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the
eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury . . . Let
me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should
refuse, or rest on inference. 106
Specifically on the issue of monopolies, Jefferson also wrote:
[It] is better to . . . abolish . . . Monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in any. . . .
[S]aying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity . . . but the
105
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benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
suppression. 107
In response, Madison argued that monopolies should be allowed in the limited
circumstances where they were beneficial and that it was thus necessary not to have an outright
prohibition against them:
With regard to Monopolies, they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances
in Government. But it is clear that as encouragements to literary works and
ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced? Would
it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the public to abolish the privilege at
a price to be specified in the grant of it? 108
In fact, Madison proposed during the Philadelphia convention to give the federal government the
power to grant “charters of incorporation.” 109 However, this proposal was voted down because,
as Rufus King of Massachusetts argued, it might lead to “mercantile monopolies,” as had
happened in England before the American Revolution. 110 George Mason also objected to giving
Congress the power to grant charters of incorporation arguing that this power would lead to
“monopolies of every sort.” 111
Jefferson refused to give in, after reviewing a draft of the Bill of Rights, and he wrote to
Madison again saying that he would have liked to have seen the following provision added to the
Bill of Rights:

107

Id. at 340 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442–43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955)).
108
1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 614–18 (1971) (quoting Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)).
109
Daniel A. Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust, 1 NYU J. L. LIBERTY 496, 506 (2005) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 141 (1990)).
110
Id.; see also JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 638 (1985).
111
Daniel A. Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust, 1 NYU J. L. LIBERTY 496, 506 (2005) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 141 (1990)); see also JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 638 (1985).

“Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature and
their own inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding __ years but for no longer term
and for no other purpose.” 112
Jefferson did not say what he meant by the word “monopoly,” but the definition in Samuel
Johnson’s dictionary at the time was: “the exclusive privilege of selling anything.” 113
Interestingly, Jefferson also opposed the creation of the federal Post Office – perhaps the
most venerable monopoly in American history. Jefferson wrote to James Madison that he
thought the newly created Post Office was “a source of boundless patronage to the executive”
and would:
job[] to members of Congress and their friends and a bottomless abyss of public
money. You will begin by only appropriating the surplus of the post-office
revenues; but other revenues will soon be called in to their aid and it will be a
source of eternal scramble among the members, who can get the most money
wasted in their states; and they will always get most who are meanest. 114
As will be discussed in more depth below, Jefferson’s opposition to the postal monopoly was
shared by Lysander Spooner, the radical political reformer and abolitionist who was also an
opponent of the postal monopoly and who challenged the federal postal monopoly in the midnineteenth century by creating a direct competitor, the American Letter Mail Company. 115
Jefferson was not the only Framer to express concern about the Constitution and grants of
monopoly privilege.

The Antifederalists also spoke out about the evils and dangers of

monopoly. 116 The most outspoken of the Antifederalists on this topic was Agrippa. Looking to
Europe’s experience with monopolies in trade, Agrippa recognized that the main threat to
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competition in most countries did not come from the market, but rather from the government
itself:
In most countries of Europe, trade has been confined by exclusive charters. Exclusive
companies are, in trade, pretty much like an aristocracy in government, and produce
nearly as bad effects. . . . In the British islands all these circumstances together have not
prevented them from being injured by the monopolies created there. Individuals have
been enriched, but the country at large had been hurt . . . because they consequentially
defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious to the general commerce, by
enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship which is the great stimulus to industry. 117
Other Antifederalists voiced the same concerns about monopolies. “A Son of Liberty”
feared that “[m]onopolies in trade [will be] granted to the favorites of government, by which the
spirit of adventure will be destroyed, and the citizens subjected to the extortion of those
companies who will have an exclusive right to engross the different branches of commerce . . .
.” 118 The Federal Farmer wrote, “As monopolies in trade perhaps, can in no case be useful, it
might not be amiss to provide expressly against them.” 119
Agrippa called for strong restraints on the ability of the federal government to grant
monopolies in the new constitution, recognizing that the “unlimited power over trade, domestic
as well as foreign, is another power that will more probably be applied to a bad than to a good
purpose.” 120

Echoing Adam Smith, whose book The Wealth of Nations was fittingly first

published in 1776, Agrippa argued:
The freedom that every man, whether his capital is large or small, enjoys of entering into
any branch that pleases him, rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to
commerce. It prevents that stagnation of business which generally precedes public
commotions. Nothing ought to be done to restrain this spirit. 121
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Six states wanted to include provisions banning monopolies and grants of special
privilege in the federal constitution. Those states were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island. 122 Massachusetts’s proposal on February 6,
1788 was that the Constitution be amended to say “That Congress erect no company with
exclusive advantages of commerce.” 123 New Hampshire and North Carolina proposed similar
amendments. 124 New York recommended: “[t]hat the congress do not grant monopolies, or erect
any company with exclusive advantages of commerce.” 125 Rhode Island’s belated ratification of
the Constitution in 1790 recommended the same language as New York, although it was too late
to have an influence. 126 Virginia’s proposal was “That no man or set of men are entitled to
separate or exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration
of public services, which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate,
legislator, or judge, or any other public office, to be hereditary.” 127 All of these proposed antimonopoly amendments to the Constitution came from the state ratifying conventions, but since
the task of writing the federal Bill of Rights in response to the requests for amendments from the
states fell to newly elected Congressman James Madison, an anti-monopoly clause was omitted
122
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from the federal Bill of Rights. Madison was stubborn, persistent, and successful in keeping an
anti-monopoly clause out of the Founders Constitution!
This is remarkable since even Alexander Hamilton, a notorious proponent of a strong
central government and of mercantilism, acknowledged the pressure from the states for an antimonopoly clause. As Hamilton said in regards to the constitutionality of a national bank:
It is remarkable that the State conventions, who had proposed amendments in
relation to this point, have most, if not all of them, expressed themselves nearly
thus: Congress shall not grant monopolies, nor erect any company with exclusive
advantages of commerce! Thus, at the same time, expressing their sense, that the
power to erect trading companies or corporations was inherent in Congress, and
objecting to it no further than as to the grant of exclusive privileges. 128
Interestingly, only one of the states that sought a federal anti-monopoly clause (North
Carolina) actually banned monopolies itself in its own state constitution. 129 This suggests that
there was greater concern about monopoly abuses at the federal level than at the state level. This
makes some sense when we remember that colonial America found itself confronted with
English monopolies when it had previously had a powerful central government. It must also be
noted that, in drafting their own state constitutions, the states focused more on the structures of
state government than they did on producing state bills of rights. Only seven states had separate
state bills of rights at the Founding while four others included some protection of rights within
their constitutions. 130
Of course, no ban on monopolies made its way into the federal constitution or Bill of
Rights. This is probably in large part due to Madison’s view that representational government at
the federal level would prevent a repeat of the English experience with monopolies:
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Is there not also infinity less danger in this abuse in our Governments than in most
others? Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few. Where the power is in
the few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and
corruptions. Where the power as with us is in the many not in the few the danger
cannot be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much more to be
dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many. 131
Madison made it clear elsewhere that the right to be free of monopolies was of vital importance.
Madison expressed his recognition of the importance of the right of individuals to earn a living in
their trade when he proclaimed:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use
of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute
their property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring
property strictly so called. 132
B.

Monopolies and the Original Federal Constitution

There are two provisions in the federal constitution which relate closely to the English
history with monopolies. First, the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article 1, Section 8 provides
that “Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” 133 As discussed above, Thomas Jefferson reluctantly agreed to the
inclusion of this clause in his correspondence with James Madison. Just as the Statute of
Monopolies in 1624 explicitly left some monopolies in place, 134 so too did the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution allow for monopolies in the form of copyrights and patents for new writings
and inventions so as to promote industry and creativity.
131
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The other provision in the original Constitution which was relevant to the monopoly issue
was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, which states “The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”135
Similar privileges and immunities clauses had also been included in many of the colonial
charters and in the Articles of Confederation, which was in some respects America’s first
constitution. 136

It is clear from an early draft of the Articles of Confederation that the

“privileges” and “immunities” which the Articles of Confederation protected were the traditional
rights that the American people had always had as Englishmen. The Articles thus provided that:
“The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the same Rights, Liberties,
Privileges, Immunities and Advantages in the other Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now
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have . . . .” 137 Of course, those traditional rights of Englishmen included the right to be free from
monopolies, so that right was conferred on Americans by the Articles of Confederation as well,
and it informs the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
This meaning of the Privileges and Immunities clause in Article IV as

banning

monopolies was recognized in the years following the adoption of the federal constitution.
While riding circuit in 1823, Justice Washington explained the meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV in Corfield v. Coryell. Corfield is a case that involved a
challenge to a New Jersey law which forbade non-residents from gathering oysters and clams.
Although Justice Washington upheld the state law that was challenged, he explained that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected a large number of fundamental rights:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles
are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole.
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind
in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or
personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the
other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges
and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description
of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned,
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by
137
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the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to use
the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old articles
of confederation) ‘the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union. 138
Justice Washington’s dictum seems to recognize federal constitutional protection for broad
economic rights including the right to choose a trade or profession. As we will discuss shortly,
Justice Washington’s definition of privileges and immunities was relied on heavily by the
drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and later by the
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in their landmark decision in the Slaughter-House Cases
which interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The anti-monopoly principle was also evident early in our federal constitutional history in
the Supreme Court’s Contracts Clause caselaw. Nineteenth Century Contracts Clause cases like
Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819, and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge in 1837,
both reflect concerns about monopoly. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, decided in 1819, the
Marshall Court held that Dartmouth College’s corporate charter, which was first granted by King
George III in 1769, was a private contract between two parties which was protected by the
Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10. 139 Thus, although the state argued that the charter was
in fact a license to do business that the state could subsequently alter, the Supreme Court held
that the New Hampshire legislature could not alter the corporation’s charter by changing the
identity of the corporation’s trustees because doing so impaired a private contract among private
individuals.

The Dartmouth College case was thus crucial in the empowering of private

corporations because once corporations were created, the state could not subsequently take away
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their corporate charter rights. 140 The reasoning of the Court’s opinion applied to for profit
corporations, as well as to non-profit corporations like Dartmouth College, and made it clear that
while the English government could revoke corporate “monopoly” powers, the State
governments in the United States could not do so without running afoul of the Contracts Clause.
This holding greatly empowered U.S. corporations and contributed substantially to U.S.
economic growth in the Nineteenth Century. Once corporations were no longer considered to be
always the monopoly recipients of special governmental grants of privilege, U.S. economic
growth really took off.
In 1837 the Taney Court modified and limited the Dartmouth College decision in Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. 141 In this case, Massachusetts had contracted in 1785 with the
Charles River Bridge Company to build and maintain a toll bridge across the Charles River and
in 1792 the state legislature extended the charter grant to the Charles River Bridge Company
from forty to seventy years. The population in Boston grew extremely rapidly, and so in 1828
the state legislature changed its mind about the seventy year charter, and it allowed another
company to build a competing bridge nearby, the Warren Bridge, which would initially charge a
fee but which would eventually become free for travelers to use. Once the Warren Bridge
became free to use, the value of the Charles River Bridge was destroyed. The Charles River
Bridge Company, relying on Dartmouth College, sued arguing that its corporate charter
monopoly was protected by the Contracts Clause.

The argument was that the state of

Massachusetts could not breach its contract with the Charles River Bridge Company to have
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exclusive rights to operate a toll bridge over the Charles River by allowing another company to
manage a competing free bridge.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, a Jacksonian, held that in cases where a corporation has an
agreement with the government for exclusive monopoly-like privileges, the terms of the
agreement should be construed as narrowly as possible because monopolies were disfavored both
as matter of constitutional history and public policy. Chief Justice Taney held that the charter
merely granted the Charles River Bridge Company the right to build a bridge, but not necessarily
the exclusive privilege of maintaining the only bridge across the river. This would undoubtedly
have surprised the original builders of the Charles River Bridge had they known as much back in
1785 when the bridge was built. A central concern for Chief Justice Taney was that upholding
the charter as a grant of exclusive privilege would promote monopoly, which he viewed as
contrary to English law and to American law by adoption:
Borrowing, as we have done, our system of jurisprudence from the English law;
and having adopted, in every other case, civil and criminal, its rules for the
construction of statutes; is there anything in our local situation, or in the nature of
our political institutions, which should lead us to depart from the principle, where
corporations are concerned? . . . We think not; and it would present a singular
spectacle, if, while the courts in England are restraining, within the strictest limits,
the spirit of monopoly, and exclusive privileges in nature of monopolies, and
confining corporations to the privileges plainly given to them in their charter; the
courts of this country should be found enlarging these privileges by implication;
and construing a statute more unfavorably to the public, and to the rights of
community, than would be done in a like case in an English court of justice. 142
Chief Justice Taney explained that if the charter given to the Charles River Bridge company
were construed broadly, as granting an exclusive privilege to operate a bridge for seventy years,
it would become difficult for courts to draw a line as to how far that right should extend. For
example, charters for turnpike roads were by 1837 facing competition from charters issued to
newly created railroads. If turnpike charters were interpreted broadly by the courts, then the
142
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holders of turnpike charters might use their old charters to prevent technological change by
challenging the railroad charters that were allowing for competition. 143

As Stanley Kutler

explains in his book on the Charles River Bridge case, the Charles River Bridge Company’s
owners were attacked for being “interests [that were] entrenched and prospering through special
privileges” obtained by legal means. 144 Jacksonians, like Chief Justice Taney, were ardently
opposed to government grants of monopoly and special privileges to the powerful and wealthy—
a phenomenon that Americans today call “Crony Capitalism.” 145
Justice Joseph Story, the closest ally of the by then deceased Chief Justice John Marshall,
and who had concurred in the decision in the Dartmouth College case, wrote a scathing dissent,
in Charles River Bridge. He argued that the Charles River Bridge’s exclusive privilege should
be protected by the Contracts Clause. Despite his association with the Democratic-Republican
Party, Justice Story was greatly influenced by Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John
Marshall, and he thus believed that private property rights should be strongly protected and that
commerce should be promoted. He saw the Charles River Bridge case not as a defeat for Crony
Capitalism but as a violation of private property rights. Justice Story was opposed to Jacksonian
democracy because he feared that popular majorities would invade the private property rights of
the wealthy and would hurt private businesses.

The tension between Taney’s and Story’s

views—the protection of corporate property rights granted by the state versus an aversion to
special laws and monopoly privileges—helped to shape the debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment in the three decades after the Charles River Bridge case was decided.
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Importantly, the Charles River Bridge case had an “immediate and widespread impact at
the state level.” 146 As Stanley Kutler notes in his book about the case, it “opened the floodgates
and courts now directly confronted and denied exaggerated implied claims of vested rights. The
state court reports are replete with cases implementing the Charles River Bridge doctrine.”147
For example, in The Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica and Schenectady Railroad Co., a New York
court applied Charles River Bridge’s rule of strict construction to hold that a bridge proprietor’s
charter did not prohibit competition from a ferry. 148 Similarly, in Tuckahoe Canal Co. v.
Tuckahoe and James River Railroad Co., the Virginia Court of Appeals held that a canal
company’s charter did not give the canal company an exclusive right of way, and that a railroad
company could construct bridges that would compete with the canal. 149 Fearing the tendency of
holders of special privileges to claim more rights than had originally been intended, the court
said that “monopoly is very ingenious in extending its rights and enlarging its pretensions.” 150
C.

The Fourteenth Amendment: A Ban on Class-Based Legislation

Chief Justice Taney’s concern with the creation of monopolies in the Charles River
Bridge case was part of a movement beginning in the early nineteenth century to ban special or
partial laws. During this period, many states amended their constitutions to prohibit the state
from granting special privileges or monopolies.

Prominent legal commentators, such as

Chancellor Kent and later Thomas Cooley, argued that laws must be general and not class-based.
There was widespread opposition to class legislation, the granting of exclusive privileges, and to
government conferred monopolies. This Jacksonian concern, which was eventually adopted by
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Abolitionists and Republicans, helped to lead to the adoption of the second sentence of Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
We think the Fourteenth Amendment has its roots in part in the Jacksonian fear of monopolies
and grants of special privilege and that the Amendment bans not only systems of caste but also
all special or partial laws that single out certain persons or classes for special benefits or
burdens. 151 This is essentially the view that was taken by the four dissenters in The SlaughterHouse Cases.
If there was one thing that all Jacksonians hated, it was government conferred
monopolies or special privileges or class legislation. “Class” in this sense refers to “class
legislation”—any legislation which singles out groups or individuals or classes of people and
grants them special privileges or imposes on them special burdens and which privileges or
burdens are not shared by the rest of society. 152 The Jacksonian aversion to class legislation is
broader than an aversion to “caste,” a term which refers only to hereditary class traits which may
be immutable (such as race, gender, or other physical features) or which are theoretically
mutable like gender, although they are practically immutable because of social attitudes. A wellknown example of theoretically mutable but practically immutable characteristics is the
traditional Hindu caste system of the Nineteenth Century wherein a hereditary social order was
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created that distinguished Brahmins from Untouchables with several other castes in between. 153
Notably, a nineteenth century dictionary definition of caste described it as not only being based
on physical or racial features but as also including a “tribe or class in the same profession” or
people with “fixed occupations” or “with “the same rank, profession, or occupation.”

154

The

view that class or caste legislation was reprehensible came to be widely held in the 1860s by the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 155
Importantly, opposition to class legislation was not a new idea invented by the
Jacksonians, but it was instead an idea that was deeply rooted in John Locke’s belief that the role
of government is to protect individuals’ natural rights. 156 Locke believed that laws should have
equal application to everyone in society and that the government should not use its power to
create laws that favored or burdened particular groups. 157 The opposition to special interest
laws, however, was not due solely to Lockean philosophical ideas on the proper role of
government. There were also important practical reasons to oppose class legislation because
favoritism or discrimination undermines the democratic process and encourages corruption. 158
The Framers of the original Constitution sometimes expressed this view, as James Madison did,
when he said that the state should be “neutral between different parts of society,” and that
“equality ought to be the basis of every law.” 159
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There is ample support in the text of the original federal constitution for the idea that
there should be generality in lawmaking and equality before the law. As Steven Calabresi and
Abe Salander point out, there are many instances where the original constitution requires that the
laws be general and not class-based. 160 First, the preamble to the Constitution states that the
purpose of the Constitution is to “provide for the common defence” and “promote the general
Welfare.” 161 Likewise, Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.” 162 The Full Faith and Credit Clause allows Congress to pass only “general laws.” 163
The Constitution’s ban on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and titles of nobility may also be
viewed as bans on various forms of class legislation.
President Andrew Jackson’s famous hatred for the Bank of the United States stemmed in
part from the fact that the Bank was a private institution which enjoyed special privileges above
and beyond those enjoyed by ordinary banks. In his message to Congress in 1832 vetoing a
statute that would have renewed the corporate charter of the Bank of the United States, a veto
message which Roger B. Taney helped to draft, President Jackson repeatedly referred to the bank
as a monopoly because it was the only bank allowed to operate under a charter from the federal
government and because it had significant control over the foreign and domestic exchange.
Pointing to the Patent and Copyrights Clause, which gives Congress the power to grant
monopolies in the limited instances of patent and copyright, President Jackson wrote that any
other grant of monopoly was the equivalent of a legislative amendment to the Constitution:
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Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants of monopolies or sale
of exclusive privileges for a limited time, or a time without limit, to restrict or
extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to execute its delegated
powers is equivalent to a legislative amendment of the Constitution, and palpably
unconstitutional. 164
For Jackson, the Bank of the United States, as a monopoly, was contrary to the principle of the
equal protection of the laws:
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal
benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By
attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed
. . . interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which
threatens to shake the foundations of our Union. . . . If we can not at once, in
justice to interests vested under improvident legislation, make our Government
what it ought to be, we can at least take a stand against all new grants of
monopolies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government
to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many . . . . 165
Rather than accede to the rich men’s request, the government should “confine itself to equal
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich
and the poor.” 166 People should “take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and special
privileges, against the prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at the
expense of the many.” 167 Jackson’s hatred of banks was not unique to him, however. There
were similar challenges brought to the special privileges granted to banks in some state courts
during the nineteenth century as well. For example, in 1813, the special debt recovery rules for a
state bank in North Carolina were challenged as a violation of North Carolina’s constitution,
which provided that “no man, or set of men, are entitled to any exclusive or separate emoluments
or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services.” 168 Similarly, in 1856
164
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a state bank charter in Indiana was challenged under that state’s privileges or immunities clause
because it was exempt from certain forms of taxation. 169
The antimonopoly cause also influenced opposition to the federal government’s postal
monopoly. In 1844, Lysander Spooner, the famous political reformer and abolitionist, founded
the American Letter Mail Company in order to challenge the constitutionality of the Post Office.
Spooner opposed the federal postal monopoly. 170

Spooner argued that the federal postal

monopoly exceeded the grant of power given too Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 “To
establish Post Offices and post Roads,” and Spooner alleged that the Post Office charged
exorbitantly high postage rates due to its monopoly power. 171

Spooner’s constitutional

argument, with which Justice Jospeh Story agreed, was that the “power to establish post offices
and post roads” is narrower than the power given to Congress under the Articles of
Confederation, which granted Congress the “sole and exclusive right [of] . . . establishing and
regulating post offices.” 172

Like Sir Edward Coke, Spooner understood the creation of

monopolies as a practice of arbitrary and despotic governments:
The idea, that the business of carrying letters is, in its nature, a unit, or monopoly,
is derived from the practice of arbitrary governments, who have either made the
business a monopoly in the hands of the government, or granted it as a monopoly
to individuals. There is nothing in the nature of the business itself, any more than
in the business of transporting passengers and merchandise, that should make it a
monopoly, either in the hands of the government or of individuals. Probably one
great, if not the principal motive of despotic governments, for maintaining this
monopoly in their own hands, is, that in case of necessity, they may use it as an
engine of police, and in times of civil commotion, it is used in this manner. The
adoption of the same system in this country shows how blindly and thoughtlessly
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we follow the precedents of other countries, without reference to the despotic
purposes in which they had their origin. 173
Spooner concluded that:
“the only absolute constitutional guaranty, that the people have against all these
evils and dangers, is to be found in the principle, that they have the right, at
pleasure, to establish mails of their own. And if the people should now surrender
this principle, they would thereby prove that their minds are most happily adapted
to the degradation of slavery. 174
As discussed earlier, Thomas Jefferson—also opposed to monopolies—was wary of
Congress’s power to create postal roads and wrote to Madison that he thought this would “be a
source of boundless patronage to the executive, jobbing to members of Congress and their
friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money.” 175 Jefferson’s concerns, voiced nearly fifty
years prior, thus resurfaced in Spooner’s efforts to challenge the federal government’s postal
monopoly.

However, due to a combination of fines, government seizure of the mail, and

competition from other mail delivery provider’s Spooner’s American Letter Mail Company was
forced out of business. 176 Nonetheless, Spooner is credited with significantly lowering the
postage rates—his obituary describes him as the “father of cheap postage in America.” 177
As Professor Melissa Saunders explains in an excellent law review article entitled “Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,” at least two esteemed legal commentators
and treatise writers prior to 1868, Chancellor Kent and Thomas Cooley, adopted and endorsed
the Jacksonian idea that the laws must be general and that they may not be class- or caste-
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based. 178 For example, Chancellor Kent wrote in 1816 that “laws should ‘have a general and
equal application’ and be ‘impartial in the imposition which [they] create.’” 179 Thomas Cooley
similarly wrote about “unequal and partial legislation” that was invalidated in various state court
cases. 180 Cooley considered it axiomatic in state constitutional law that
[T]hose who make the laws are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to
be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor . . . [E]very
one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special
statute which . . . singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law
from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate
legislation. 181
Cooley also wrote that “Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be
the aim of the law” and that “Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discriminations
against persons or classes are still more so.” 182 This view found its way into several state
constitutions, as will be discussed in more detail in the section below. A number of states had
adopted constitutional provisions aimed at prohibiting special or partial laws prior to the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
There was an important exception to the ban on class legislation, however. If the law
could be shown to serve a “public purpose,” it would be upheld. As Justice Field later explained
in the 1885 case, Barbier v. Connolly, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “[c]lass legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others,” but does not prohibit “legislation which, in
carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application” to certain individuals or groups. 183
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Importantly, the purpose of the law cannot be to grant a special benefit to a particular individual
or group—the purpose must be to promote an important public purpose.

The Fourteenth

Amendment thus only allows laws that discriminate if the laws “are designed, not to impose
unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good.” 184 This idea was expressed as well in Corfield v.
Coryell where Justice Washington indicated that fundamental rights could always be trumped by
just laws enacted for the good of the whole people. 185
Opposition to class legislation and the need for generality in lawmaking were expressed
in state court decisions throughout the country in the 1820s to the 1860s. In 1824, the Maine
Supreme Court stated, “it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a
special law . . . granting a privilege and indulgence to one man” that is not granted to “all other
persons.”

186

Rather, laws should be “prescribed for the benefit and regulation of the whole

community” because all individuals have “an equal right” to their “protection.” 187 Similarly, in
1881 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that “general laws are enacted, which bear . . .
on the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the whole
community will be interested to procure their repeal.” 188
In an 1831 decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors struck down a law which
prohibited suits from being brought by an Indian reservee if the suit was prosecuted for the
benefit of another party. 189 The state law applied only to a small amount of land that was
established under treaties between the Cherokees and the U.S. government. Because the treaties
184
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were secured to the reservees for the right of citizenship, they were entitled to the same
constitutional protections as the citizens of the state. 190 The court explained that “no free man
shall be disseized of his freehold, or deprived of his property, but by the judgment of his peers or
the law of the land.” 191 Further, “Every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy
or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar
consequences, is unconstitutional and void.” 192 Since the law applied only to a small amount of
land granted to reservees under the treaty, the court ruled that the law was unconstitutional and
void as a partial law. 193
In another Tennessee case in 1844, the state Supreme Court ruled that a law which
allowed trustees of a particular trust to receive a donation made to an unincorporated association
was void under the constitutional requirement that legislators may not suspend a general law for
the benefit of particular individuals. 194 The constitution said that “the legislature shall have no
power to pass any law, for the benefit of individuals, inconsistent with the general laws of the
land, nor to pass any law granting to any individuals rights, privileges, immunities, or
exemptions other than such as may be by the same law extended to any member of the
community who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of this law.” 195
A similar view was presented in 1859 in Wisconsin; the state supreme court explained the
need for generality in lawmaking in the course of striking down a law that taxed some property
at a lesser rate than other property within a city. 196 The court said:
The theory of our government is, that socially and politically, all are equal, and
that special or exclusive, social or political privileges or immunities cannot be
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granted, and ought not to be enjoyed; and, therefore, the burdens of supporting the
government should be borne equally by all the individuals composing it, in
proportion to the benefits conferred. To give permanency and force, and secure its
rigid observance, limitations or restrictions were introduced into the constitution
of this state. 197
Likewise, in an 1859 Ohio Supreme Court case, the dissent argued against a law which
established separate schools for blacks and whites. 198 On caste-based legislation, he argued that
it is:
the inveterate vice of absolute governments, is inconsistent with the theory and
spirit of a free and popular government like ours; asserting in its bill of rights the
equality of all men. A free government like ours must be presumed, so far as
practicable, to avoid class legislation; and rather to trust and favor the natural
liberty and right of individuals to form and regulate their own social circles and
classification according to their respective predilections and prejudices. 199
Recognizing a change in the law over the past decade, the judge concluded that “it seems to me
alike unwise and wholly out of character with the progress, the general intelligence, and
liberality of the age at this time—more than ten years after the repeal of the ‘black laws,’ . . . to
give an extent and effect to those disabling statutes.” 200
In a habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1859, the court ruled
that a law requiring a license to sell goods in the market—which the court described as class
legislation—did not prohibit a man from selling goods outside the market. 201

The judge

remarked that “Excessive legislation—the vice of all free governments—is, perhaps, the fault of
the State. Through haste, inadvertence, and other causes . . . class legislation is to be found
frequently upon our statute book[s]. Something should be done to arrest this evil. The dearest
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rights of the people are jeopardized.” 202

Further, “A peaceable citizen, who discharges

punctually all his public duties, and respects scrupulously the rights of others, should be left free
and untrammeled as the air he breathes, in the pursuit of his business and happiness” and that
“best sympathies of [his] heart are, and always will be, interested for one who is, or may be,
incarcerated, because, in the proud consciousness of a freeman, he claims the right to offer for
sale . . . any commodity he may possess, the traffic in which is not forbidden by the laws of the
land.” 203
By the 1840’s and 1850’s, opposition to special and partial laws was so widespread
among Jacksonian Democrats that even their Abolitionist opponents began to borrow the
Jacksonian idea. Abolitionists argued—quite rightly—that the Slave Power in the South had
seized the government and was using it to create an oligarchy that oppressed African Americans.
The famous abolitionist Lysander Spooner is an example of someone who understood this
connection. Spooner was both an early opponent of monopolies—as evidenced in his opposition
to the federal postal monopoly in the 1840’s 204—and one of the most outspoken abolitionists
during this time period. Spooner wrote in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, in 1860, that the
institution of slavery is contrary to the Constitution. Further, the Constitution should be read to
be consistent throughout and that “the right to send and receive letters by post [which he believed
to be the case], is a right inconsistent with the idea of a man’s being a slave.” 205
The Abolitionists’ Slave Power argument was attractive to many erstwhile Jacksonian
Democrats and a number of Jacksonian Democrats eventually joined the antislavery cause. For
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example, Representative Norton Townshend, a Democrat from Ohio, spoke out against slavery
in the following terms on the House floor:
I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic creed, and against
any such interpretation of Democracy as makes it the ally of slavery and
oppression. Democracy and slavery are directly antagonistic. Democracy is
opposed to caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special privileges;
slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by one class-to use another as brute
beasts and take their labor without wages; Democracy is for elevating the laboring
masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery grinds the laborer into the very
dust . . . slavery is but the extreme of class legislation . . . slavery is nothing more
than the privilege some have of living out of others . . . 206
Another representative, associated at times with the Democratic Party but who allied himself
with the Radical Republicans, John F. Farnsworth said, “As a moral being, as a man, I hate
slavery in the States of this Union as I hate serfdom in Russia—which, by the way, is about to be
abolished in that Empire, while we are quarrelling over the extension of slavery in this—just as I
hate caste in India—just as I hate oppression everywhere.” 207 Indeed, as Saunders explains, by
the mid-1850s “thousands of these heirs of the Jacksonian political tradition left the Democratic
Party for the Republican Party, driven by the belief that the former was ‘no longer the champion
of popular rights that it had been in Jackson’s day’ but had become ‘the tool of a slave holding
oligarchy.’” 208 The radical Republican, Senator Sumner, explained the connection between
slavery and monopoly as follows:
The Rebellion began in two assumptions. . . . first, the sovereignty of the States,
with the pretended right of secession; and, secondly, the superiority of the white
race, with the pretended right of Caste, Oligarchy, and Monopoly, on account of
color. . . . The second showed itself at the beginning, when South Carolina alone
among the thirteen States allowed her Constitution to be degraded by an exclusion
on account of color . . . . 209

206

32nd Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 713 (1852) (statement of Norton S. Townshend).
36th Congress Special Session Cong. Globe 120 (1861) (Statement of Representative John F. Farnsworth).
208
Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 266
(2003).
209
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 686 (1866) (Statement of Senator Charles Sumner).
207

In fact, for Sumner, slavery was a system of caste:
A Caste cannot exist except in defiance of the first principles of Christianity and
the first principles of a Republic. It is heathenism in religion and tyranny in
government. The Brahmins and the Sudras in India, from generation to
generation, have been separated, as the two races are now separated in these
States. If a Sudra presumed to sit on a Brahmin's carpet, he was punished with
banishment. But our recent rebels undertake to play the part of the Bramhins, and
exclude citizens, with better title than themselves, from essential rights, simply on
the ground of Caste, which, according to its Portuguese origin, casta, is only
another term for race. 210
Sumner went as far as to propose legislation banning all systems of caste, class, and monopoly in
the Senate in 1866. The language he used for the proposed statute was extremely broad:
There shall be no Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly invested with
peculiar privileges and powers, and there shall be no denial of rights, civil or
political, on account of color or race anywhere within the limits of the United
States or the jurisdiction thereof; but all persons therein shall be equal before the
law. 211
The connections between the Abolitionist movement, disenfranchisement of blacks, and
opposition to class-based laws generally was drawn in a series of 1857 Maine Supreme Court
decisions that were reached on the same day. These cases rejected the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dred Scott and held that free black men have the right to vote as citizens of the state of Maine.
The decisions in Maine were in response to an interrogatory from the Maine State Senate that
asked whether “freed colored persons, of African descent, having a residence established in some
town in this state . . . are men, women, children, paupers, persons under guardianship, or
unnaturalized foreigners” and, thus, whether they have the right to vote. 212
In an opinion from Judge Appleton, the court makes clear its views on Dred Scott and its
reading of the Privileges and Immunities clause in Article IV. 213 Judge Appleton began by
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proclaiming that “The constitution of Maine recognizes as its fundamental idea, the great
principle upon which all popular governments rest—the equality of all before the law. It confers
citizenship and entire equality of civil and political rights upon all its native born population.”214
The court relied on historical evidence: original state constitutions, the Declaration of
Independence, and state court decisions recognizing the freedom of inhabitants without regard to
ancestry or color. 215 It concluded that “colored freemen were regarded as citizens, and entitled to
the right of suffrage, in most of the states, during the whole period of the revolution.” 216 It said
as well that Dred Scott was not “obligatory” on the state courts. 217 Since the federal constitution
does not impose restrictions as to who might become citizens of a state, and because the people
of Maine did not make distinctions on the basis of status or class, but instead “formed a
constitution upon principles of the purest democracy, making no distinctions and giving no
preferences, but resting upon the great idea of equality before the law,” black men must and do
have the right to vote. 218 As Judge Davis also explained in a third decision, if the federal
government were really able to define certain classes as being either citizens or as being noncitizens under the guise of construing Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, then the
federal government would effectively be “establishing privileged classes” which is “in violation
of [the Constitution’s] letter and spirit.” 219
Immediately after the end of the Civil War in 1865 and 1866, many Southern States
adopted a set of racially discriminatory laws that came to be known as the Black Codes. These
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laws limited the rights to contract, own property, travel, and testify in court of all the former
slaves. The Black Codes:
perpetuated or created many distinctions in the criminal law by applying unequal
penalties to Negroes for recognized offenses and by specifying offences for
Negroes only. Laws which prohibited Negroes from keeping weapons or from
selling liquor were typical of the latter. Examples of discriminatory penalties
were the laws which made it a capital offence for a Negro to rape a white woman
or to assault a white woman with intent to rape . . . . In addition to the
discrimination of the criminal laws, post-war black codes hedged in the Negroes
with a series of restraints on their business dealings of even the simplest form.
Though in many states the Negro could acquire property, Mississippi put sharp
limitations on that right. But most restrictive were the provisions concerning
contracts for personal service. Many statutes called for specific enforcement of
labor contracts against freedmen, with provisions to facilitate capture should a
freedman try to escape. Vagrancy laws made it a misdemeanor for a Negro to be
without a longterm contract of employment; conviction was followed by a fine,
payable by a white man who could then set the criminal to work for him until the
benefactor had been completely reimbursed for his generosity. 220
The Black Codes were widely criticized as being a forbidden form of class legislation which
sought a monopoly over black labor. For example, in an editorial in the Chicago Tribune in
1866, the author warned that “if the several States can practi[c]e class legislation, as between
whites and blacks . . . they can also create class distinctions in the future between rich and poor,
or between any other divisions of society.” 221
The 39th Congress’s response to the Black Codes was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
Civil Rights Act required that “there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities
among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or
previous condition of slavery.” Despite the broad language, it was explained by the bill’s
drafters that the Act only applied to “civil” rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights (and not
“political” rights, such as the right to vote). This included the right to make and enforce
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contracts, sue, be parties, to own land and personal property, and be subject to the same criminal
punishments.
After the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed, however, there was still fear among
supporters of Reconstruction that the Civil Rights Act would be struck down as an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. As a
solution, Congress began working on the Fourteenth Amendment to write the Civil Rights Act
into the Constitution. This would protect it from challenge in the courts or from a later Congress
changing the law. However, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment also went beyond the
protections under the Civil Rights Act. As Melissa Saunders explains in her aforementioned
article, the support for legislation to guarantee the civil rights for blacks among the Republicans
and Jacksonian Democrats was primarily on opposition to class legislation and the spirit of
monopoly more generally. 222 As James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, said,
there is no room for class legislation in a democratic government—laws aimed “against [one
class] for the purpose of advantaging the interests of [another]” were prohibited. 223 The Black
Codes themselves were objectionable because they violated Blackstone’s maxim that “the
restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all” 224 as Senator Lyman Trumbull, cosponsor
of the Civil Rights Act, explained. Thus, the purpose went beyond discrimination against blacks
and included all class-based legislation.
Popular accounts of the Amendment also understood it to be far reaching. For example,
the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin said it was an “opportunity . . . for the masses to break
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down the domination of caste and aristocracy” 225 and the Boston Daily Advertiser described its
purpose as “compel[ling] the States to . . . throw the same shield over the black man as over the
white, over the humble as over the powerful.” 226

Similarly, the Cincinnati Commercial said the

Amendment constitutionalized “the great Democratic principle of equality before the law” and
invalidated all “legislation hostile to any class.” 227 As Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert argue:
By connecting the old-world problems of aristocracy and feudalism with race
discrimination and caste in America, these commentators provide more evidence
that the American public conceived of the word caste at a higher level of
generality than the word race. The Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment would have understood it to ban European feudalism or the Indian
caste system, as well as the special-interest monopolies that so outraged
Jacksonian Americans. 228
The meaning of the Privileges or Immunities clause itself grew out of the Privileges and
Immunities clause of Article IV. Article IV was well-understood at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to be a ban on discrimination against nonresidents of a state, as the
Supreme Court laid out in the Corfield case discussed above. Similarly, then, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause was a ban on discrimination, but in this case it
was a ban on class or caste discrimination. As Steven Calabresi has explained elsewhere, 229 the
text of the amendment’s references to “privileges or immunities” together with the verb
“abridge” is a legal term of art. The Fourteenth Amendment’s use of the word “abridge” makes
this point clearer. Abridge means to shorten or abbreviate. It is widely accepted that the
Fourteenth Amendment banned the Black Codes, which lessened or abridged the civil rights of
African Americans compared to whites. The Black Codes would fall because they were an
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example of the Slave Power trying to perpetuate itself by giving its supporters monopoly power
over the lives of the freed African-Americans. In fact, President Andrew Johnson stated that the
Black Codes were objectionable because “‘there is no room for favored classes or monopolies,’
for ‘the principle of our Government is that of equal laws,’ which ‘accord equal justice to all
men, special privileges to none.’” 230 This is the same as his view regarding slavery, which he
said was “a monopoly of labor.” 231

Thus, “abridge” is meant to be synonymous with

discrimination, similar to its use in the Fifteenth Amendment, which says that “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 232
The intellectual, legislative, and judicial history leading up to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment thus confirms what the text of Section One of that amendment implies.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a ban not only of racially discriminatory laws but also of all classbased legislation and certainly of any legislation that set up a system of caste or monopoly. This
included the right to be free from unreasonable government interference into one’s trade.
Representative John Bingham, the primary author of the privileges or immunities clause,
understood the clause to protect “the liberty . . . to work in an honest calling and contribute by
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your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to the support of your fellowmen, and to be
secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of your toil.” 233

Similarly, another representative

questioned during the amendment’s drafting: “Has not every person a right, to carry on his own
occupation, to secure the fruits of his own industry, and appropriate them as best suits himself . .
. ?” 234 Thus, grants of monopoly would certainly be prohibited under Section One unless they
were somehow just laws enacted for the general good of the whole people. The original public
meaning of the words of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 would have been
understood to be a ban on caste, monopoly, and on systems of class legislation. The Amendment
required some degree of generality in law-making.
D.

Economic Liberty Cases: Slaughter-House, Lochner, & the New Deal Cases

The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment immediately became the subject of
controversy in 1873 in the Slaughter-House Cases. In that case, a group of Louisiana butchers
challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that incorporated and granted a twenty-five year
slaughterhouse monopoly to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-house Company.
The butchers challenged the statute as violating the U.S. Constitution and in particular the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. 235 Importantly, the butchers also argued at length that
the Louisiana slaughtering monopoly violated the common law rule of Darcy and the Statute of
Monopolies. In fact, counsel for the butchers read Sir Edward Coke’s report of Darcy to the
Court, and cited it in full in the brief. 236 Emphasizing that the English creation of monopolies
had helped to give rise to the American Revolution, the butcher’s counsel then pointed out:
It was from a country which had been thus oppressed by monopolies that our
ancestors came. And a profound conviction of the truth of the sentiment . . . that
233
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every man has a right to his own faculties, physical and intellectual, and that this
is a right, one of which no one can complain, and no one deprive him―was at the
bottom of the settlement of the country by them. Accordingly, free competition in
business, free enterprise, the absence of all exactions by petty tyranny, of all
spoliation of private right by public authority―the suppression of sinecures,
monopolies, titles of nobility, and exemption from legal duties―were exactly
what the colonists sought for and obtained by their settlement here, their long
contest with physical evils that attended the colonial condition, their struggle for
independence, and their efforts, exertions, and sacrifices since. 237
Counsel for the butchers explained that this common law right was recognized by state
courts in several states before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. For example,
in 1856, Connecticut’s Supreme Court of Errors relied on Darcy v. Allen and the Statute of
Monopolies to strike down a law which granted a franchise to a corporation giving it an
exclusive privilege to use streets to lay gas pipe. 238 In another case in 1837, the New York
Chancery Court refused to enforce a city ordinance which would have prohibited a manufacturer
of pressed hay from erecting a wooden frame building while allowing another manufacturer to
do so. 239 And in a case with facts remarkably similar to those in Slaughter-House, the Supreme
Court of Illinois struck down a Chicago ordinance which limited the ability to slaughter animals
to only one firm. 240 In reference to the city’s municipal laws, the court said that such a law
“impairs the rights of all other persons, and cuts them off from a share in not only a legal, but a
necessary business.” 241 Additionally, such laws “must be reasonable, and such as are vexatious,
unequal or oppressive, or are manifestly injurious to the interest, of the corporation, are void.
And of the same character are all by-laws in restraint of trade, or which necessarily tend to
237
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create a monopoly.” 242 As Justice Field acknowledged in his dissenting opinion, “In all these
cases there is a recognition of the equality of right among citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary
avocations of life, and a declaration that all grants of exclusive privileges, in contravention of
this equality, are against common right, and void.” 243 Significantly, while none of the abovementioned states had provisions in their constitutions prohibiting monopolies, the local
ordinances were still struck down.
The butchers’ counsel also argued that the privileges or immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment embodied an unenumerated right to be free from monopolies which went
beyond Darcy v. Allen and the Statute of Monopolies. As the butchers’ counsel explained, the
rights protected under the privileges or immunities clause “are undoubtedly the personal and
civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments
of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country.” 244
Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion for four members of the Court, agreed with the
butchers. Citing Corfield v. Coryell, discussed in Part I.B.2 above, Justice Field recognized
Justice Washington’s definition of the term “privileges and immunities” as encompassing a
number of unenumerated rights that he deemed fundamental. Thus, since Article IV’s privileges
and immunities clause prohibited discriminatory legislation against non-residents, the Fourteenth
Amendment likewise functioned to prohibit such discriminatory class legislation by residents of
one state against other residents of the same state:
What the clause in question did for the protection of the citizens of one State
against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the fourteenth
amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against
hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, whether they
reside in the same or in different States. If, under the fourth article of the
242
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Constitution, equality of privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of
different States, under the fourteenth amendment, the same equality is secured
between citizens of the United States. 245
Justice Field argued that Justice Washington’s definition of privileges and immunities in
Corfield v. Coryell should be taken as definitively informing the meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Field then

explained why he thought that the right to be free from partial laws was a fundamental
right of United States citizens:
This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial
enactments, in the lawful pursuits of life throughout the whole country, is the
distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them, everywhere, all
pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than
such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and
condition . . . . This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and
unless adhered to in the legislation of the country our government will be a
republic only in name. The fourteenth amendment, in my judgment, makes it
essential to the validity of the legislation of every State that this equality of right
should be respected. 246
Justice Field also quotes Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations at length (as did the butchers in
their briefs). He emphasized the idea that a person’s labor is his property and is the foundation
for all other property:
“The property which every man has in his own labor,” says Adam Smith, “as it is
the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his
own hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what
manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this
most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of
the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders
the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from
employing whom they think proper.” 247
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Thus, in a sense Justice Field’s dissenting opinion merged the previously opposing views in the
Charles River Bridge case, discussed in Part I.B.2 above. For Chief Justice Taney, what was
offensive in Charles River Bridge was the state’s grant of a monopoly to the bridge company.
However, for Justice Story, it was paramount to protect the bridge company’s property right in
what he saw as its contract with the state. Justice Field folded both of these views into his
dissenting opinion in The Slaughter-House Cases, recognizing both the right to be free from
monopolies and the right to one’s property in his or her labor.
Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court in The Slaughter-House Cases rejected the
butchers’ arguments, holding that the state granted monopoly was constitutional and nearly
writing the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment. 248 In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Miller limited the Privileges or Immunities Clause to apply only to those
rights which “own their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws.” This included things like the ability to assert claims against one’s
government, free access to seaports, protection while on the high seas and when within the
jurisdiction of a foreign government. 249
Interestingly, Louisiana later amended its constitution to ban monopolies like the
Slaughter-House monopoly. The monopolist butchers, who had won in federal court, challenged
the amendment to the state constitution under the Contracts Clause—just as the Charles River
Bridge Company had done thirty-five years earlier in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.
Once again the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state could abolish a monopoly without violating
the Contracts Clause, so it upheld in 1884 Louisiana’s constitutional amendment, eliminating the
248

See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on
Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1108 (2004) (stating that, “The
Privileges or Immunities Clause was gutted by the Supreme Court in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases, but for a
good originalist like me that does not matter.”).
249
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80.

butchers’ slaughtering monopoly. 250 The Slaughter-House dissenters returned to their arguments
in Slaughter-House, again arguing that the grant of monopoly violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and Darcy in the first place. However, the majority ruled on a narrower ground that
Louisiana did not have the power to make the state-granted monopoly irrevocable. 251
While the Slaughter-House Cases closed a door on reading the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to strike down grants of economic privilege and of monopoly, and other cases, such as
Munn v. Illinois in 1877 and Barbier v. Connolly in 1895, further weakened the protection of
economic liberty and constrains on the state police power under the Fourteenth Amendment 252
later Court decisions reached different conclusions. The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
bans class legislation and embodies the protection of economic rights was revived at the turn of
the twentieth century with the 1897 case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 253 and in 1905 in Lochner v.
New York. 254

Justice Field’s Slaughter-House dissent clearly inspired the Supreme Court

majority in both Allgeyer and Lochner. As one legal scholar wrote, “In 1873, a bare majority
resisted the dissenters’ appeal to social compact and natural law and vested rights ideology; but a
generation later, a new majority embraced substantive due process.” 255 In Lochner, Justice
Rufus Peckham held that a law which limited bakers’ hours to ten-hour days and sixty-hour
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weeks violated liberty of contract, which he said was protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Peckham’s view was that the purpose of the regulation was to
equalize bargaining power between employers and employees, and that it was not a just law
enacted for the good of the whole people and to promote health and safety concerns as was
claimed by the state.

Lochner rendered at least some forms of redistribution of wealth

constitutionally suspect, 256 and the opinion seemed to imply that the sixty-hour work week for
bakers was motivated by a desire to protect big bakeries from competition from smaller, harderworking immigrant competitors. 257 There was thus an element of state enforced special privilege
or monopoly to the case. As a result of the Lochner opinion, a wave of “liberty of contract”
cases were decided in federal and state courts. Ultimately, the whole period of time between
1905 and 1937 became known as the Lochner era.
Justice Peckham’s opinion in Lochner, like the Slaughter-House dissent, became famous
for its robust conception of constitutionally protected economic liberties. One scholar has argued
that many of the laws struck down during the Lochner era were in fact the result of rent-seeking
behavior. 258 Both the Lochner decision and Slaughter-House dissent show an interest in one’s
right to freely work. But, the decision in Lochner can also be distinguished from the decision in
the Slaughter-House Cases. Whereas Lochner announced a right to liberty of contract in all
contexts, the Slaughter-House Cases dealt with a different and arguably distinct issue—the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on grants of monopoly or special privilege. And while
some laws aimed at restricting economic liberty may be discriminatory class-based legislation,
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such as exemptions for one industry and not another, it is not always the case that laws that
restrict economic liberty are class based.
In the wake of the Great Depression and of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal,
the Supreme Court eventually retreated from the holding and opinion in Lochner, and it rejected
the idea that the Constitution protected a broad liberty of contract.

First, Lochner was

significantly weakened in 1934 when the Supreme Court relaxed the level of scrutiny it would
apply in cases of economic regulation in Nebbia v. New York. 259 Although the Supreme Court
did not explicitly repudiate Lochner in Nebbia, it did hold that a price control setting the
minimum price for milk was constitutional so long as it was nondiscriminatory and so long as it
bore a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 260 In 1937, however, the
Supreme Court radically repudiated Lochner in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. In that case, the
Supreme Court overturned a prior decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, and it upheld a state
minimum wage law for women. 261 The overturning of the Adkins decision was understood at the
time and it in fact turned out to be a decisive repudiation of the whole Lochner line of cases.
Lochner had argued that an individual’s liberty of contract could only be overcome by a
reasonable exercise of the police power, and the Lochner Court evaluated reasonableness
employing what readers today might call middle level scrutiny. 262 The New Deal Supreme
Court never abolished liberty of contract, but it dropped the level of scrutiny for state regulations
of the police power from middle level scrutiny to a very deferential form of rational basis review.
In its 1938 landmark holding in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court said
that economic regulations would be presumed to be constitutional and would be upheld unless
259
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they were irrational even if the legislators’ actual intent could not be proven. 263 The Court
dropped any interest whatsoever in determining whether a law created exclusive privileges or
whether it reflected monopolistic class legislation.

To the Carolene Products Court, all

economic and social legislation was constitutional unless it discriminated against a discrete and
insular minority, or closed off the channels of political change, or violated one of the first eight
amendments in the Bill of Rights. Lochner was officially dead.
The new highly deferential rational basis review did not, however, immediately take hold
in all the cases decided by the New Deal Supreme Court after 1937. As Professor Victoria
Nourse explains in her book, In Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near Triumph of
Eugenics, the New Deal Supreme Court decided at least one important case using the old
nineteenth century idea that the Fourteenth Amendment banned forms of arbitrary class
legislation. 264 In Reckless Hands recounts the use of eugenics in the 1920s and 1930s in asylums
and prisons across in the United States, and the challenge to one eugenics law in a 1942 New
Deal era case, Skinner v. Oklahoma. In Skinner, an Oklahoma law was challenged by a man who
was sentenced to sterilization for being a repeat offender—he had stolen chickens and had also
been convicted of armed robbery. The goal behind the Oklahoma statute, like other eugenics
laws, was to “weed out” criminals from society by sterilizing repeat offenders who violated
many criminal statutes.

However, the Oklahoma statute provided exceptions for repeat

violations of “prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses.” 265
Clarence Darrow, the famous lawyer in the Scopes Monkey Trial, challenged
Oklahoma’s imposition of sterilization for robbers but not embezzlers saying it was not only
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“‘senseless and impudent,’” but also that it “impos[ed] a ‘caste system.’” 266 And, as another
lawyer on the case argued, 267
“I have wondered upon what rational basis the Legislature could have arrived at
the conclusion that all those committing minor offenses would transmit to their
progeny only vices; while the dishonest financier who appropriates trusting
depositor’ monies in the banks, or trustees who convert funds of confiding clients,
and the saboteur, and the inciter of reason could spew from his loins only progeny
blessed with virtues. The terms of the Act exclude from its penalties the Capones,
the Ponzis, and the Benedict Arnolds.” 268
The Supreme Court struck the law down in an opinion by Justice Douglas who
reasoned—relying on the traditional pre-1937 understanding of the equal protection clause—
laws which drew arbitrary lines were unconstitutional as a form of class legislation or a grant of
an exclusive privilege. 269 Nourse points out that arbitrariness was the “basic test for equal
protection claims,” even into the 1930s 270 and that laws which provided arbitrary exemptions for
certain classes of people showed unconstitutional legislative favoritism. 271
Class legislation, under the traditional understanding, is, as Nourse describes it, a “theory
of failed governance.” 272 In so arguing, Nourse draws correctly on the work of John Hart Ely in
Democracy and Distrust. 273 When a legislature draws a line between classes and provides
exemptions, it favors the exempted group and discriminates against a class. In Skinner, the
legislature protected those convicted of “high class” crimes, such as political or financial crimes,
and burdened those guilty of “low class” crimes, such as chicken thieves, who were subject to
sterilization if they were repeat offenders. 274 Such laws create an “‘aristocracy of crime,’” as one
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of Skinner’s lawyers described it, by violating the “rule of generality” that was promoted by
Thomas Cooley, who in turn had borrowed the same ideas from John Locke. As Cooley stated,
there ought to be “‘one law for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at
plough.’” 275 As Nourse concludes in In Reckless Hands:
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Skinner fits standard legal models that put the
prohibition of ‘caste’ legislation at the core of constitutional equality protections.
The problem in Skinner was not with the distinction between chicken thieves and
embezzlers simpliciter. The problem was with a criminal law as a rule of
genetics, as a rule of blood—this was class made permanent . . . Oklahoma’s law
created a line between privileged and unprivileged blood the sign of caste and
aristocracy. 276
Nourse recognizes that from 1868 until 1937, equal protection cases were usually about
“property, taxes, and the right to work” rather than being about race or sex as they commonly are
today. 277 The traditional concern with class legislation, exclusive privileges, and monopoly
“focused on exemptions in statutes as a proxy for political favoritism, on the theory that the law
should be general, not partial.” Such principles “reach[] as far back as the founding generation,”
and it is “clear” that the founders “aimed to prevent aristocracy, [and] rule by blood . . . The
theory of ‘class legislation’ has always been about the fight against aristocracy.” 278
Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1942 proved to be a temporary backward glance by the justices
of the Supreme Court to the Nineteenth Century era when the Fourteenth Amendment was
understood to ban class legislation and associated monopolies. The 1937 decision in West Coast
Hotel and the 1938 decision in United States v. Carolene Products foretold the future of the
Fourteenth Amendment which was to be about strict scrutiny of racial classifications and rational
basis scrutiny for almost everything else. While not mentioning Lochner by name, the Court
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made it clear that Lochner-style review for economic regulations was no longer available in its
1949 decision in Railway Express Agency v. New York. The Court said there that:
We do not sit to weigh evidence . . . in order to determine whether the regulation
is sound or appropriate; nor is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom. We
would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all
municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic
problem. 279
The new standard of rational basis review of economic and social legislation, in fact “looked
more like judicial abdication than judicial review.” 280
Williamson v. Lee Optical showed, in 1955, just how pathetic and meaningless the new
rational basis review standard really was. The case held that if there was any hypothetical
rationale that the justices could think up for a law, even if it was not the rationale used by the
legislature, the law would be upheld. 281 The facts in Williamson v. Lee Optical are troubling to
say the least. An Oklahoma law prohibited anyone who was not a licensed optometrist or
ophthalmologist from dispensing lenses or fitting lenses into frames except where there was a
prescription from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist. The law also prohibited solicitation
for sale of eyeglass frames by those did not have the required license.
The law was clearly an example of special interest legislation enacted to financially
benefit optometrists and ophthalmologists by forcing patients to get an unwanted and unneeded
eye exam every time they wanted to buy a new pair of glasses.

Justice Douglas was at

something of a loss for a rationale to support this law, but he finally hypothesized that maybe the
law would encourage people to get needed eye exams. The law in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.
279
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was an obvious example of special-interest legislation, and the fact the Supreme Court upheld it
sent a signal that anything goes in the area of economic and social legislation. The Fourteenth
Amendment may have been meant to bar caste, class based legislation, exclusive privileges, and
monopolies, but after Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. that was all moot.
In 1963, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, the Court finally explicitly overruled Lochner, holding
that “[t]he doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases—that due
process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely—has long since been discarded.” 282 Ironically, just two years later, the Supreme
Court reinvented substantive due process as to certain social matters, but not as to economic
regulation, in Griswold v. Connecticut. 283 This doctrine led ultimately to the Court’s invalidation
of abortion laws in Roe v. Wade 284 and to its invalidation of sodomy laws in Lawrence v.
Texas. 285 The modern Supreme Court has shied away from economic substantive due process,
but it has enforced the Takings Clause with a pre-1937 vigor in such cases as Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 286 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 287 and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. 288 The Supreme Court has also abandoned the New Deal Court’s use of the
rational basis test for sex discrimination cases in Goesaert v. Cleary 289 for skeptical scrutiny in
United States v. Virginia, 290 and it has struck down a law targeted at gay people using the
rational basis test in Romer v. Evans. 291 It also struck down an ordinance that burdened the
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mentally retarded using the rational basis test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. 292 The Court has also held that alienage and illegitimacy are suspect classes. 293
In short, the Supreme Court’s current caselaw interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment is
a mess. The Court has made exceptions to New Deal rational basis scrutiny in discrimination
cases involving sex, sexual orientation, mental retardation, alienage, and illegitimacy while it has
also abandoned the rational basis test with respect to abortion laws, laws governing
contraception, laws banning sodomy, and the incorporated federal Bill of Rights.

Recent

Takings cases reviewing zoning regulations seem clearly contrary to the post-1937 New Deal
understanding. The Supreme Court needs to abandon the tiers of scrutiny and get back to the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court needs to realize that the Fourteenth
Amendment bans class legislation, the granting of exclusive privileges, and grants of government
monopoly power.
In a recent concurring opinion, Judge Janice Rogers Brown of the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit described current protections economic liberty since the New Deal
in frank terms:
America’s cowboy capitalism was long ago disarmed by a democratic process
increasingly dominated by powerful groups with economic interests antithetical to
competitors and consumers. And the courts, from which the victims of
burdensome regulation sought protection, have been negotiating the terms of
surrender since the 1930s. 294
Judicial abdication over the last half century is troubling in light of the overwhelming evidence
summarized in this paper—from English and colonial history, from the debates on the federal
292
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constitution and its ratification, and from the legislative history on the Fourteenth Amendment—
that people have a right to be free from monopolies and grants of special privilege.
The Court’s approach to economic liberty cases is at war with the original meaning of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Framers of the Constitution understood the
shortcomings of the democratic process, and they foresaw the development of factions (special
interest groups) which would game the legislative process to get monopoly or oligopoly rents.295
The Constitution was written to allow the courts to protect the Republic from the worst excesses
of factions. In other words, the Constitution was designed to, as Judge Brown says,
Thwart threats to the Republic: the political temptation to exploit the public appetite for
other people’s money—either by buying consent with broad-based entitlements or selling
subsidies, licensing restrictions, tariffs, or price fixing regimes to benefit narrow special
interests. 296
The Founders envisioned a government that was capable of preventing grants of special
privileges, and, in extreme cases, preventing the conferral of outright monopolies, just as Sir
Edward Coke argued almost four centuries ago.

The responsibility for striking down

infringements on economic liberty falls on the courts. 297 Over the last half-century, the courts
have failed to meet this responsibility.
E.

“Private” Monopolies & Federal Antitrust Law

One final wrinkle remains concerning the federal government and the problem of
monopolies and that is to address how it is that the monopoly problem came to be seen after
1890 as a problem that stemmed mostly from private concentrations of economic power and not
from corrupt government grants of power and licenses. The answer is that there was a growing
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concern with private monopolies—those that developed without special grants from the state—in
the late nineteenth century in part because of what we would today call a problem of Crony
Capitalism. With the establishment of general incorporation laws in many states, parties became
able for the first time to establish separate corporate entities that were protected by limited
corporate liability and which benefited from perpetual life and legal personhood. Prior to the
adoption of general incorporation laws, corporations were created by an act of the legislature one
corporation at a time, or in England by a charter from the King.

This system of private

incorporation leant itself to corruption and abuse and to the granting of special privileges or
monopolies. As a result, it was replaced in the United States by general laws beginning in the
early nineteenth century that allowed incorporation whenever certain pre-existing conditions
were met. 298
General incorporation laws, however, led to some abuses. In some cases, these laws
enabled the consolidation of capital into the hands of a few players. 299 As Thomas Cooley
warned in 1874:
[T]he most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created;
some of the great and wealthy corporations actually [have] greater influence in the
country at large and upon the legislation of the country than the States to which
they owe their corporate existence. 300
As a result, there was a growing fear among members of the general public after the Civil War
that corporate monopolists would work to ensure that the state served their private economic
interests rather than serving the general interests of the public at large. 301 For example, as early
as 1880, the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties began speaking out against the “land,
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railroad, money, and other gigantic monopolies.” 302 Even the patent system was called into
question for conferring private monopolies that undermined the public well being. General Ben
Butler, the presidential candidate for the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties criticized the
sewing machine monopoly, for example, which benefited from the protection of a patent. 303 The
Union Labor Party (which was a coalition of the Greenback Party, the Knights of Labor, and the
farmer movement) declared in 1888 that “The paramount issues to be solved in the interests of
humanity are the abolition of usury, monopoly, and trusts, and we denounce the Democratic and
Republican parties for creating and perpetuating these monstrous evils.” 304
The railroads were one of the most despised industries. In fact, as early as the Civil War,
the railroad monopoly was recognized as a problem. Thanks to land grants from the federal
government to build railways in the West, the industry was a hotbed of Crony Capitalism. Even
during the Civil War, the federal government had to seize some railroads for the war effort. But
in addition, in 1864, the House of Representatives found it necessary to pass a bill to authorize
every railroad company in the country to carry government supplies, freight, mails, troops, and
passengers notwithstanding any contrary monopoly. 305 The bill’s not-so-hidden goal was to
abolish one railroad monopoly granted by the State of New Jersey in particular. A monopoly
was held by the Camden and Amboy Railroad of New Jersey, which had an exclusive right of
transit through New Jersey (including transportation outside the state to New York City and
Philadelphia). The State granted the monopoly charter in exchange for stock in the railroad. 306
Senators who were in favor of the bill to abolish the New Jersey state monopoly included none
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other than Charles Sumner, the radical Republican who decried monopolies and grants of special
privilege in his support the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 307
In the 1865 Senate debates on the bill, Senator Sumner discusses the English history and
the historic ban on monopolies while explaining his support of the federal override of the New
Jersey state monopoly. 308 Senator Sumner also quotes approvingly Daniel Webster’s argument
against the monopoly granted by the State of New York in Gibbons v. Ogden as support for the
constitutionality of Congress using the Commerce Clause to override a state granted monopoly.
He said: “‘Now I think it very reasonable to say that the Constitution never intended to leave
with the States the power of granting monopolies either of trade or of navigation; and therefore,
that as to this, the commercial power is exclusively with Congress.’” and later “I insist that the
nature of the case and of the power did imperatively require that such important authority as that
of granting monopolies of trade and navigation should not be considered as still retained by the
states.’” 309

Sumner even likened the New Jersey monopoly to Apollyon in Pilgrim’s

Progress, 310 with New Jersey as the Valley of Humiliation “through which all travelers north and
south must pass, and the monopoly, like Apollyon, claims them all as ‘subjects,’ saying ‘for all
that country is mine, and I am the principle and god of it.’” 311
Sumner describes the monopoly not only as hostile “to the Union,” but, importantly, “as
hostile to the spirit of the age, which is everywhere overturning the barriers of commerce.”312
He feared, using graphic terms, that if New Jersey was not checked in its grant of monopoly,
other states would soon follow:
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The taste of revenue is to a Government like the taste of blood to a wild beast,
quickening and maddening the energies, so that it becomes too deaf to all
suggestions of injustice; and the difficulties must increase where this taxation is
enforced by a far-reaching monopoly. The State, once tasting this blood, sees
only an easy way of obtaining the means it desires; and other States will yield to
the same temptation. . . . A profitable Usurpation, like that of New Jersey, would
be a tempting example to other states . . . Let this Usurpation be sanctioned by
Congress, and you hand over the domestic commerce of the Union to a succession
of local impost taxes . . . Each State will play the part of Don Quixote, and the
Union will be Sancho Panza, compelled to receive on his bare back the laches
which were the penance of his master. 313
Senator Sumner continued by further tying his opposition to the railroad monopoly to his
hatred of the institution of slavery—which, as discussed previously in this article, he also argued
was a government granted monopoly over the labor of African Americans:
The present pretension of New Jersey belongs to the same school with that
abhorred and blood-bespattered pretension of South Carolina . . . . The monopoly
which was founded on the hideous pretension of property in man obtained a
responsive sympathy in that other monopoly which was founded on the greed of
unjust taxation, and both were naturally upheld in the name of State rights. Both
must be overthrown in the name of the Union. South Carolina must cease to be a
slave State, and so must New Jersey. All hail to the genius of universal
emancipation! All hail to the Union, triumphant over the rebellion, triumphant
also over a usurpation which menaces the unity of the Republic! 314
Despite Sumner’s colorful arguments, and despite other efforts by advocates of the bill, the
measure was not brought to a vote in the Senate because of a lack of the votes to pass it. 315
Opposition to railroad monopolies did not end with the federal opposition to the New Jersey
railroad monopoly. As it turned out, this debate in 1864 foreshadowed public hostility toward
the railroads in the coming years.
By the 1870s, the Grange Movement was formed as a group of farmers, who made
opposition to monopolies their central issue to rally against and whose motto was in part the
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phrase “Down with Monopolies.” 316 The Grangers, as they were called, were mostly opposed to
the railroad industry, which had driven up the price of transportation for grain. While the
railroad companies were private companies and had not necessarily received exclusive privileges
to operated railways, they did receive substantial benefits from the government which helped
them establish monopoly economic power. Indeed, railroad companies received “tremendous”
government subsidies, including both state and federal land grants, vast eminent domain powers,
special tax treatment, and government bonds. 317 These special benefits or privileges were well
known both by Congress and by some members of the general public in the late nineteenth
century. Railroads may well be natural monopolies, but the railroads in the United States had
also had a lot of government help in securing the very land on which to lay their tracks. There
was undoubtedly an element of Crony Capitalism at work in the building of the American
railroads.
In the early debates regarding regulation of the railroad industry, several newspaper
articles were recited to the House Committee on Commerce regarding the railroad industry:
Sooner or later the people will understand their rights and will maintain them, if
this is their government and not one of the railroad fools and rings. – New York
Journal of Commerce
. . . [The railroad companies] have been hedged in and protected on every side by
statutes in their interests, while the people, who have nourished them until they
have grown to the state of giants, and in many cases the insolence and despotism
of tyrants, are left almost wholly at their mercy. It is surely time that the people
began to look after their own interests. – Rochester Morning Gerald, December
21, 1881
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. . . No people in the world have welcomed the railroad era so joyfully as
Americans; no other people have done so much, by land-grants and corporate aid,
to build railroads. . . . – Buffalo Express. 318
Special treatment for railroads was justified on the grounds that railroads provided a
public benefit by enabling people and goods to be transported across the country. This was
surely true. As for the railroad companies’ eminent domain powers, the takings of land on which
to lay tracks were consistently upheld during the antebellum era because the land would be used
for the public purpose of providing transportation, despite the fact that the direct benefits went to
the private railroad companies. 319 Although the railroads’ vast economic power can be credited
in part to special benefits given to the companies by governments, the solution for the Grange
Movement was regulation and more government power and not the free market. 320 The public
came to think that the railroad industry in Europe was highly regulated from the early stages of
its development and that it did not suffer from the same rate-abuse problems as did the railroad
system in the United States. As a result, the Interstate Commerce Act was passed in 1887,
primarily in order to regulate railroad rates.
However, the Grangers, along with many others during this period in American history,
did not only oppose the railroads. They also opposed the big trusts, such as the Standard Oil and
U.S. Steel trusts. There was a fear that these trusts threatened liberty because they would corrupt
politicians by seeking special benefits and government monopoly privileges much as Andrew
Jackson had feared with the Bank of the United States. The trusts did indeed benefit enormously
from the very high protective tariffs which late nineteenth century politicians enacted into law
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and which protected the trusts’ industries from foreign competition. 321 One of the things the
trusts sought and got from politicians during this era was a very high tariff which directly
benfitted American manufacturers at the expense of consumers. The trusts were also accused of
both driving out competitors and driving up prices—thus hurting other businesses and
consumers. The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed in 1890, was largely aimed at prohibiting these
kinds of privately-established restraints on trade, as well as regulating the various railroad
cartels.
According to Judge Robert H. Bork in his landmark book critiquing the state of federal
antitrust law in the 1970s, The Antitrust Paradox, the 1890 Sherman Act’s primary aim was the
promotion of consumer welfare. 322 Similarly, the original 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act and the
1914 Federal Trade Commission Act were both passed, according to Judge Bork, to reinforce the
consumer welfare protections of the Sherman Act. 323 The concern in the Progressive Era with
protecting consumer welfare called for prohibitions on predatory business tactics and on
horizontal mergers aimed at creating monopolies and cartels. Wide discretion was left to the
courts to develop specific rules. 324 Another stated purpose of the 1890 bill’s sponsor, Senator
John Sherman, was to codify at the federal level the common law rule, which existed in many
states, outlawing private contracts that operated as restraints on trade. 325 However, as Judge
Bork points out, the common law doctrine on restraints of trade and monopolies had been quite
“diverse” and “contradictory” and did not consistently promote competition. 326 For example,
Senator Sherman relied on cases that suggested that the common law prohibited Standard Oil’s
321

IRVING J. SLOAN, 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 7 (1976).
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 61 (1993); see also Robert H.
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7, 7 (1966).
323
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 63 (1993)
324
Id. at 20.
325
IRVING J. SLOAN, 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 12 (1976).
326
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20 (1993)
322

railroad rebates, cartel agreements, and horizontal mergers aimed at creation of monopoly while
he ignored other cases that might have suggested a contrary conclusion. 327 That said, Senator
Sherman and other supporters of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 were quite clear about their
version of the common law. Judge Bork describes that version as an “an artificial construct,
made up for the occasion out of a careful selection of a few recent decisions from different
jurisdictions, plus a liberal admixture of the senators’ own policy prescriptions.” 328
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was inspired, at least in small part, by the Statute of
Monopolies. For example, both the Statute of Monopolies and the Sherman Act gave common
law courts the power to hear cases regarding alleged monopolies and provided for the same
remedies: treble damages and costs to the aggrieved parties. 329 In addition, while arguing for
passage of the law, Senator Sherman said that the trusts “smacked of tyranny ‘of a kingly
prerogative,’ and that a nation that ‘would not submit to an emperor . . . should not submit to an
autocrat of trade.’” 330 Recognizing, at least in part, that the government itself might have had
something to do with the trusts’ monopoly power, Sherman said that “if the combination is aided
by our tariff laws they should be promptly chained, and, if necessary, equal competition with all
the world should be invited in the monopolized article.” 331 It is doubtful that Senator Sherman
was sincere regarding tariff policy, however. Shortly after the Sherman Act was passed, he
supported the highly protectionist McKinley Tariff in 1890, which raised the average duty on
imports to nearly fifty percent!
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The Sherman Antitrust Act did break with the traditional English and American concern
about monopolies in one critical regard. By the Sherman Act’s plain language, it applies to all
monopolies, regardless of their source: “[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 332 Nonetheless, notwithstanding a few rare cases
involving governments outside the United States, 333 antitrust policy in the United States has been
primarily aimed at prohibiting only private monopolies, which is ironic to say the least since the
most effective monopolies are undoubtedly those that are backed up with government power. In
addition, today under the Parker doctrine, state-sanctioned monopolies are immune from
scrutiny under the Sherman Antitrust Act in recognition of state sovereignty and the importance
of federalism. 334 The Parker doctrine has been rightly critiqued as a “complete inversion of the
proper approach.” 335 As Richard Epstein argues, “State-sponsored cartels in the aftermath of the
New Deal legitimation are more permanent and more dangerous than privately operated ones,
but they are given complete immunity from the antitrust act. This is not the way we want the
system to operate.” 336
Also, whereas the common law historically disfavored contracts that were restraints on
trade, such contracts were unconnected to the central concern regarding government-created
monopolies. For example, in Rogers v. Parrey, which was decided in 1613, a carpenter sued
another carpenter for violation of an agreement to cease to practice carpentry for a period of
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twenty-one years in exchange for payment. 337 Sir Edward Coke held that although absolute
restraints on trade were invalid under the common law, since this was a restraint for a certain
time and place for valuable consideration, it was a valid agreement. 338 Nowhere in the case does
Coke mention Darcy v. Allen, which was decided just ten years prior in 1603. Further, as
discussed previously, prohibiting the abuse of royal monopolies was a priority for Coke at the
time since King James I was a great abuser of the royal prerogative in this area. The fact that
Coke was willing to weaken the common law rule as it relates to consensual agreements among
private parties that restrained trade while seeking to strengthen the rule prohibiting royal
monopolies also suggests thqt the danger posed by monopolies in Coke’s view was primarily
with government grants of monopoly power. Thus, besides the fact that the common law
prohibitions on voluntary restraints on trade and monopolies both reflect the common law
interest in efficiency, the two rules otherwise do not appear to be linked.
Corporations are, however, unlike wholly private actors in one crucial way: corporations
derive their very existence from the state. Further, although there are general corporate laws in
place today (such that anyone may establish a corporation), corporations benefit from legal rights
that individuals do not, including limited liability and perpetual life. This fact has not gone
unnoticed for supporters of antitrust policy in the United States. As one leftist economist, Henry
Carter Adams, argued in 1894:
At the bottom of every monopoly may be traced the insidious influence of the
peculiar privileges which the law grants to corporations. . . . [C]orporations assert
for themselves rights conferred on individuals by the law of private property, and
apply to themselves a social philosophy true only of a society composed of
individuals. 339
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In attempting to reconcile the Supreme Court’s upholding of the constitutionality of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1904 in Northern Securities 340 with its decision in Lochner in 1905, Daniel
Crane writes that the “conception of liberty as freedom from government coercion is hard to
reconcile with the antitrust project until one sees that the evil that antitrust addresses is caused by
a governmental dislocation of the market.” 341
But the argument that private monopolies were possible due to the development of
general corporate laws is not persuasive. General incorporation law, enabling virtually all people
to form corporations, was an option available to all and thus was not a special privilege given
only to a few monopolists. Moreover, the general incorporation laws can be defended on the
ground that such laws merely lower the transaction costs of forming what were previously
complex partnerships by substituting partnership agreements with a standard corporate form. It
is doubtful that merely lowering the transaction costs for the creation of certain types of business
associations, which largely could still exist absent general incorporation laws, led to the
development of trusts.
While the Privileges or Immunities clause is a near dead letter in the U.S. Constitution,342
and the Lochner era ended with the New Deal, the states are still free to protect liberty in their
own respective state constitutions to a greater degree than the federal government does. Indeed,
Louisiana amended its constitution after the Slaughter-House Cases to prohibit monopolies, and
Louisiana did not act alone since other states have adopted anti-monopoly provisions as well.343
Part III will explore the several state constitutional provisions that prohibit monopolies and the
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early state cases interpreting and applying these provisions.

Part III will also review the

applications and limitations of these provisions in modern state constitutional law and will
discuss why many states have not adopted such provisions in their constitutions.
III.

MONOPOLIES

AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

While the federal Constitution does not have an explicit antimonopoly provision, such
provisions are included in nineteen state constitutions today. 344
antimonopoly provisions at the Founding. 345

Only two states had

By 1868, four states included antimonopoly

provisions and several others included prohibitions on the granting of exclusive privileges or
immunities. 346 Provisions were also added in state constitutions after 1868 including in the
Progressive Era. 347 Some of the more recently added provisions appear to be primarily or even
exclusively concerned with prohibiting private monopolies, 348 but many states use similar
language as was used in the provisions from the time of the Founding and of 1868 when a ban on
monopoly meant only a ban on a government grant of privilege. 349
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Some of the state constitutional provisions banning monopoly were broadly worded to
prohibit any unequal grant of privileges or immunities to certain citizens or classes of citizens.350
Others, however, are more narrowly worded and prohibit only the grant of monopolies or of
exclusive privileges. We will focus here on the narrower State provisions which expressly
banned monopolies and exclusive privileges.
This section discusses the roots of the state constitutional tradition on bans of
monopolies, which is based in part on the Jacksonian aversion to monopolies and grants of
special privilege discussed above. We will then discuss the adoption of state constitutional
provisions in three distinct periods: 1) at the Founding, 2) during the nineteenth century, and 3)
during the progressive era. Third, we will discuss the application of these state constitutional
provisions in state courts during the twentieth century and the influence of federal constitutional
law and treatment of economic liberty cases on state court decisions. Finally, this section
concludes by discussing potential reasons as to why not all states have included provisions
prohibiting monopolies and grants of special privilege today.
A.

A Tradition Rooted in Jacksonian Democracy & Changes in Corporate Law

State constitutional prohibitions on monopolies and the granting of exclusive privileges
are closely tied to the states’ traditional prohibition of partial and special laws which developed
during the antebellum era, as discussed previously in Part I.B.3 above. 351 During this period,
state courts routinely struck down laws that granted special benefits or imposed special burdens
on persons or classes of people. 352 Prohibitions on partial or special laws in some form were
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included in nearly every state constitution during the first half of the nineteenth century. This
state constitutional tradition was closely tied to the Jacksonian conception of democracy.
A central tenet of Jacksonian democracy was that the state should not establish
monopolies or grant special privileges to particular individuals or classes of people. 353 For this
reason, President Jackson opposed the second Bank of the United States in part because it had
monopoly powers. Jackson argued that “the ‘great evils to our country and institutions might
flow from such a concentration of power in the hands of a few men irresponsible to the
people.’” 354 One of Jackson’s journalists wrote that “All Bank charters, all laws conferring
special privileges, with all acts of incorporations [sic], for purposes of private gain, are
monopolies, inasmuch as they are calculated to enhance the power of wealth, produce
inequalities among the people, and subvert liberty.” 355 Another wrote that: “to have the land
scattered over with incorporated companies, is to have a class of privileged, if not titled,
nobility.” 356
However, President Jackson’s opposition to corporations in the 1820s and 1830s should
not be viewed by modern readers as an opposition to corporations as they exist today. As a
matter of corporate law history, it is important to note that it was not until the late nineteenth
century that most states passed general incorporation laws. Before that time, people had to
obtain a special grant from the legislature, or in England from the King, in order to establish a
353
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corporation. 357 The thirteen colonial charters from which the thirteen original States grew were
all in essence just special licenses from various English Kings.
Special grants of corporate status from a legislature were referred to as statutory charters
and were not merely limited to being licenses for a corporation to exist. Rather, statutory
corporate charters were more like constitutions that established a corporation’s internal
structure. 358 These grants by definition gave special privileges to the incorporators since not
everyone was able to obtain a charter from the legislature. Common benefits of corporate status
included limited liability from claims against the corporation, immunity from debts, and the
ability to sue and be sued. 359 Early on, corporate charters were primarily issued to what may
today be considered public utilities, including businesses involved in transportation, water
supply, insurance, and banks. 360

As one New England politician and lawyer, Theodore

Sedgwick, pointed out in 1835, “corporations can only obtain existence . . . by a special grant
from the legislature. Charters of corporations are therefore grants of privilege, to be exclusively
enjoyed by the corporators . . . . Every grant of exclusive privilege, strictly speaking, creates a
monopoly.” 361
James Willard Hurst points out in his book on the history of corporations in the United
States that the Jacksonian attack on corporations was much less an attack on the corporate status
of such entities than it was a complaint about the special privileges or immunities some
businesses enjoyed that were denied to other similar businesses and individuals. 362 Special
privileges or immunities were commonplace for legislatively chartered corporations in the early
357
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nineteenth century. These privileges or immunities included the ability to issue bank notes
(which was generally limited to incorporated banks) and to exercise the power of eminent
domain—a power which was given to some railroads. 363 It may help to consider a specific
example: the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, which was a New Jersey corporation
that was exempt from having to pay taxes on much of its property, which was given authority to
conduct lotteries, which could exercise power of eminent domain, and which enjoyed a subsidy
that exempted its workmen from all taxes and military service. 364
It was not until the development of general incorporation laws, beginning in the midnineteenth century, that corporate law in the United States ceased to be a field of special grants
of privilege to a few individuals. In fact, the development of general incorporation laws was
itself closely tied with the Jacksonian abhorrence for monopolies and for what we would today
call “Crony Capitalism”. 365 General incorporation acts within the states were developed to
correspond to the various state constitutional bans on special privileges, including antimonopoly
provisions and bans on exclusive privileges. In fact, in his book on the American business
corporation, Ronald Seavoy describes general incorporation statutes for business as a “major
aspect of the social and political forces that democratized American society” during what Seavoy
calls the “Age of Jackson, 1825–1855.” 366 For example, when the 1846 New York Constitution
was adopted, it provided that corporations were to be formed under general laws of incorporation
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and that special charters were banned except in certain limited instances. 367

As historian

Gordon Wood describes these laws, they
“Opened up the legal privileges to all who desired them” . . . [and] “Within a few
years most of them became very different from their monarchical predecessors:
they were no longer exclusive monopolies and they were no longer public. They
became private property and what Samuel Blodget in 1806 called ‘rivals for the
common weal.’” 368
General incorporation laws were critical to preventing the states from granting special
economic advantages to one group over another, and they democratized all the benefits of having
corporations by allowing anyone to set up a corporation if they followed the right procedures for
doing so. Limited liability for corporations might also be considered part of the democratization
of corporate law as well, because it lessened the risks associated with investment, thus making
investments a possibility for people with fewer assets. General incorporation laws thus were
answers to the “Jacksonian outcry against corporations . . . [that] all should have reasonably
equal access to the benefits of incorporation.” 369 As Ronald Seavoy explains in The Origins of
the American Business Corporation, general incorporation laws were at the core of laissez-faire
and of Jacksonian thought. The goal was to remove the government from involvement with the
formation of corporations by making the benefits of forming a corporation available to all. 370
As constitutional lawyer Timothy Sandefur describes this change in incorporation law
during the nineteenth century, “the corporation was shorn of its special monopolistic status and
became instead what contemporaries called ‘self-created societies’ whose existence was merely
367
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certified or recognized by the state’s ministerial act.” 371 The privatization, so to speak, of
corporations meant that the new corporations were not defined by government decree, but rather
by the contractual obligations and rights that were established by investors or by the directors of
the corporation. 372 Indeed, today it is incorrect to refer to corporations as “creatures of the state”
because general incorporation statutes typically provide that corporations exist automatically
once the necessary filings have been made.

The government need not grant any special

permission for a corporation to be formed. 373
B.

The Adoption of Antimonopoly Provisions
1.

Provisions Adopted at the Founding

The first two states to ban monopolies in their state constitutions were Maryland and
North Carolina. Both state constitutions included essentially the same language. Maryland’s
Bill of Rights provided (and, in fact, still does to this day), “That monopolies are odious,
contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to be
suffered.” 374 Similarly, North Carolina’s Constitution read “That perpetuities and monopolies
are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed.” 375 Like Maryland, North
Carolina’s constitution also contains essentially the same language today. 376
While there are not many early cases interpreting these provisions, the North Carolina
Supreme Court did interpret and apply its antimonopoly provision in 1855. The case involved
whether a railroad could build a bridge over a stream although another company had an
371
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exclusive right from the state to operate a toll bridge across the same stream. 377 The court ruled
that the railroad could build the bridge because the state could not grant perpetuities or
monopolies to private parties. In applying the North Carolina Constitution, which prohibited
both exclusive privileges and monopolies, the court noted that:
“[T]he people” who were then exercising the highest act of sovereignty—that of
making a government for themselves, forbade the creation of monopolies and put
an end to all such as then existed.
...
The meaning and purpose was to forbid and abolish all hereditary and perpetual
monopolies as “contrary to the genius of a free State,” and to put in motion the
“new State” they were then organising, as a free representative republican
government, relieved from all fetters and trammels previously existing by which
its action might be cramped or circumscribed, and fully authorised to do every
thing necessary and proper to accomplish its mission, i.e. promote the general
welfare. 378
As this passage illustrates, the provisions in both constitutions firmly reflect the traditional
concerns about state-created monopolies.
In addition, eight states at the time of the Founding had Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. Those states included: Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia. 379

For example, Massachusetts’s

constitution of 1780 provided that “no subject shall be . . . deprived of his property, immunities,
or privileges . . . but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” 380 and “No man, nor
corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and
exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the
377
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consideration of services rendered to the public.” 381 North Carolina’s constitution if 1776, which
also banned monopolies, said that “No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.”382
Virginia’s Constitution of 1776 stated “That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services;
which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge, to be
hereditary.” 383 These Clauses all would seem to ban monopolies under any plausible reading of
their language.
2.

The Middle to Late Nineteenth Century

By 1868, four states had explicit antimonopoly provisions in their constitutions. 384 The
new states to include antimonopoly provisions by the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment were Tennessee and Texas. 385 Two states would follow shortly thereafter: Arkansas
and Georgia. Several other states had prohibitions on exclusive privileges. At least four states
also had prohibitions on exclusive privileges by 1868 (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri,
and New Jersey). Several more, including South Dakota, Colorado, and Louisiana, would follow
shortly thereafter. 386
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Tennessee’s Constitution provided in 1834 “That perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of free State, and shall not be allowed.” 387

Texas adopted an

antimonopoly provision in 1868, which similarly read, “Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary
to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of
primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.” 388 In an early Texas case, which
struck down a law granting a businessman the exclusive right to sell meat and fish within the city
limits in exchange for building a town hall facility, the court determined the purpose of the
antimonopoly provision to be as follows:
To place the people of the city, with respect to fresh meats and fish, at the mercy
of [the businessman], or any other person, would be to allow a most dangerous
monopoly, notwithstanding the prohibition in the bill of rights, which was
intended to protect the people against just such monopolies, and to give them the
right to have fair competition in the markets to which they must resort to purchase
the necessaries of life. And this is one of the most important bulwarks thrown
around the liberties of the people. Whatever tends to evade or destroy the effect
of it should be denounced as void by the courts of the country. 389
In the years shortly following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, two more
states, Arkansas and Georgia, amended their Constitutions to ban monopolies.

Arkansas’s

Constitution of 1874, which mirrored its earlier constitutions (except the constitution of 1868),390
banned monopolies by providing, “Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
republic, and shall not be allowed . . . .” 391 Relatedly, the Arkansas Constitution also provided
that “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen nor class of citizens, privileges or
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 392 In 1877,
Georgia’s constitution provided that “The General Assembly of this State shall have no power to
387
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. . . make any contract, or agreement whatever, with any such corporation, which may have the
effect, or be intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen competition in their respective
businesses, or to encourage monopoly; and all such contracts and agreements shall be illegal and
void.” 393 Both states’ constitutions contain antimonopoly provisions today. However, Georgia
changed the wording of its provision, and it seems to have weakened, its language. The Georgia
constitution now reads that monopolies are unlawful and void, but statutes which lessen
competition may be permissible in several circumstances. 394
While some states passed antimonopoly clauses, others included prohibitions on granting
exclusive privileges, which arguably provides even broader protection against government
favoritism than is provided by a monopoly ban. New Jersey adopted a clause prohibiting the
granting of exclusive privileges in 1844. It provided that “The legislature shall not pass . . . laws
in any of the following enumerated cases; . . . Granting to any corporation, association or
individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever . . . .” 395 Connecticut’s
Exclusive Privileges Clause provided in 1818 that “no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive
public emoluments or privileges from the community.” 396 Other states to have privileges or
immunities provisions by 1868 included Arkansas (in 1868), 397 Georgia (in 1868), 398 Indiana (in
1851), 399 Iowa (in 1857), 400 Oregon (in 1857), 401 South Carolina (in 1868), 402 Tennessee (in
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1834), 403 and Texas (in 1845). 404

South Dakota (1885), 405 Colorado (1876), 406 and

Louisiana’s 407 provisions, which were added after 1868, are similarly worded.
The text of these state privileges and immunities clauses varied greatly. For example,
Georgia’s simply stated “The social status of the citizen shall never be the subject of legislation.”
Arkansas’s more typical language was that: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen
or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens.” Likewise, Iowa’s clause provided that: “All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of
citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens.” South Carolina’s Reconstruction era constitution explicitly referred to race, saying
“Distinction, on account of race or color, in any case whatever, shall be prohibited, and all
classes of citizens shall enjoy, equally, all common public, legal, and political privileges.”
Reference to a social contract theory of government is found in both Texas and Kentucky’s
privileges and immunities clauses. Kentucky’s Constitution of 1850 stated “That all freemen,
400

“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
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when they form a social compact, are equal, and that no man or set of men are entitled to
exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of
public services” and Texas’s constitution of 1845 said that: “All freeman, when they form a
social compact, have equal rights; and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate
public emoluments or privileges.” All these clauses were supplemented as well by bans in some
form on titles of nobility and on feudalism in both the federal and in many state constitutions.
A review of the case law suggests that prohibitions on the granting by state governments
of exclusive privileges functioned in much the same way as did the antimonopoly provisions. As
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held in 1856 when striking down a law which granted the
exclusive right use city streets to lay gas pipes to provide gas to the city:
[A]lthough we have no direct constitutional provision against a monopoly, yet the
whole theory of a free government is opposed to such grants, and it does not
require even the aid which may be derived from the Bill of rights, the first section
of which declares “that no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive public
emoluments, or privileges from the community,” to render them void. 408
Thus, for the court, the right to be free from monopolies was central to the existence of a free
government, much as the North Carolina case had argued which we mentioned above. 409 Even
without the prohibition on exclusive privileges, any law granting a monopoly must be void.
However, for the Connecticut court, the prohibition on exclusive privileges was also sufficient to
render the law void as well. However, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts’s 1814 explanation
of the provision suggests that the prohibition on exclusive privileges is broader than a ban on
monopolies:
[I]t is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice .
. . that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to
all others under like circumstances; or that anyone should be subjected to losses,
408

The Norwich Gaslight Co. v. The Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856) (note that this case was cited
by the butchers’ counsel in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 48).
409
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damages, suits or actions, from which all others under like circumstances are
exempted. 410
Privileges and immunities clauses in the states have also been useful for striking down
state grants of monopoly. For example, the Washington Supreme Court struck down a Seattle
ordinance taxing vending machines but not in-person sales because “[t]he tendency of this kind
of an income is to foster monopolies, for a monopoly exists when the manufacture and sale of
any commodity is restrained to one or a certain number . . . If this ordinance can be sustained, . . .
the constitutional guaranty [of the privileges and immunities provision] becomes a dead
letter.” 411 Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court held in 1904 that the State’s refusal to grant a
license to operate a sailors boarding house for the purpose of maintaining only one boarding
house “upon the theory that the issuance of only one license at the port of Portland would
advance the shipping interests, improve the condition of seamen, and promote the welfare of the
public” violated the Oregon Constitution’s privileges and immunities clause. 412 Importantly, the
court noted that although Justice Miller ruled in the Slaughter-House Cases that states have the
ability to grant exclusive rights to carry on certain businesses under the Fourteenth Amendment,
this was not the case under the privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution.
Despite the Slaughter-House ruling, the court decided that “under a Constitution like ours, we
feel satisfied that [granting exclusive rights] cannot be done.” 413
Still, some states struck down similar laws during this period without reference to the
protection of any economic rights, but rather because the exercise of that power was not within a
city’s charter. This was the case in the 1856 case, cited in Slaughter-House and discussed above,
in Connecticut. Connecticut’s Supreme Court of Errors court relied on Darcy v. Allen and the
410
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Statute of Monopolies to strike down a law which granted a franchise to a corporation giving it
an exclusive privilege to use streets to lay gas pipe. 414 Similarly, in an 1837 New York case, the
chancery court refused to enforce a city ordinance which would have prohibited a manufacturer
of pressed hay from erecting a wooden frame building while allowing another manufacturer to
do so. 415 In a third case, in 1867 the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a Chicago ordinance
which limited the ability to slaughter animals to only one firm. 416 In reference to the city’s
municipal laws, the court said that such a law “impairs the rights of all other persons, and cuts
them off from a share in not only a legal, but a necessary business.” 417 The court warned that a
city’s by-laws “must be reasonable, and such as are vexatious, unequal or oppressive, or are
manifestly injurious to the interest, of the corporation, are void. And of the same character are
all by-laws in restraint of trade, or which necessarily tend to create a monopoly.” 418
3.

The Progressive Era

The popular fear of the so-called “Robber Barons” of the Industrial Era made people
concerned with the consequences of privately created monopolies. 419 As discussed in greater
detail in Part I.B.2. above, with the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, 420 and the
Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914, 421 the Progressive-era provisions in state constitutions similarly
reflect a shift away from concerns with directly state-granted monopolies to a fear of private
414
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monopolies, perhaps facilitated by Crony Capitalism. For example, the Alabama Constitution
provided in 1901 that:
The legislature shall provide by law for the regulation, prohibition, or reasonable restraint
of common carriers, partnerships, associations, trusts, monopolies, and combinations of
capital, so as to prevent them or any of them from making scarce articles of necessity,
trade, or commerce, or from increasing unreasonably the cost thereof to the consumer, or
preventing reasonable competition in any calling, trade, or business. 422
Similarly, the Minnesota Constitution stated in 1888 that:
Any combination of persons, either as individuals or members or officers of any
corporation to monopolize the markets for food products in this state, or to interfere with,
or to restrict the freedom of such markets, is hereby declared to be a criminal conspiracy
and shall be punished in such manner as the Legislature shall provide. 423
In 1911, the New Mexico Constitution stated that “The legislature shall enact laws to prevent
trusts, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.” 424 Other states to include these types
of provisions are Washington in 1889, 425 Kentucky in 1891, 426 Utah in 1895, 427 South Dakota in
1896, 428 New Hampshire in 1903, 429 and Arizona in 1910. 430
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Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this state, and no incorporated company,
copartnership, or association of persons in this state shall directly or indirectly combine or
make any contract . . . for the purpose of fixing the price or limiting the production or
regulating the transportation of any product or commodity. The legislature shall pass laws for
the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties, and in case of incorporated companies,
if necessary for that purpose, may declare a forfeiture of their franchises.
426
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KY CONST. OF 1891, § 198.
UTAH CONST. OF 1895, art. 12, § 20:
Any combination by individuals, corporations, or associations, having for its object or effect
the controlling of the price of any products of the soil, or of any article of manufacture or
commerce, or the cost of exchange or transportation, is prohibited, and hereby declared
unlawful, and against public policy. The Legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of
this section by adequate penalties, and in case of incorporated companies, if necessary for that
purpose, it may declare a forfeiture of their franchise.
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S.D. CONST. OF 1896, art. 17, § 20 (note that South Dakota also prohibited exclusive privileges granted by
the state as well):

The Oklahoma Constitution of 1907 said that the state legislature “shall define what is an
unlawful combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement, in restraint of trade” 431 and “enact
laws to punish persons engaged in any unlawful combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement,
in restraint of trade, or composing any such monopoly, trust, or combination.” 432 Perhaps more
so than all other state provisions during this period, Oklahoma’s constitution reflects the shift
from concern over government abuse of power in granting monopolies to a fear of the power of
private companies.
It is important to note that not all changes to state constitutions regarding monopolies
during this period were concerned with private monopolies. For example, when Wyoming’s
Constitution was adopted in 1889, it provided that “Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to
the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed. . . .” 433 Thus, Wyoming included language

Monopolies and trusts shall never be allowed in this state and no incorporated company,
copartnership or association of persons in this state shall directly or indirectly combine or
make any contract . . . to fix the prices, limit the production or regulate the transportation of
any product or commodity so as to prevent competition in such prices, production or
transportation or to establish excessive prices therefor. . . . The Legislature shall pass laws for
the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties and in the case of incorporated
companies, if necessary for that purpose may, as a penalty, declare a forfeiture of their
franchises.
429

N.H. CONST., art. 83:
Free and fair competition in the trades and industries is an inherent and essential right of the
people and should be protected against all monopolies and conspiracies which tend to hinder
or destroy it. The size and functions of all corporations should be so limited and regulated as
to prohibit fictitious capitalization and provision should be made for the supervision and
government thereof. Therefore, all just power possessed by the state is hereby granted to the
general court to enact laws to prevent the operations within the state of all persons and
associations, and all trusts and corporations, foreign or domestic, and the officers thereof, who
endeavor to raise the price of any article of commerce or to destroy free and fair competition
in the trades and industries through combination, conspiracy, monopoly, or any other unfair
means; to control and regulate the acts of all such persons, associations, corporations, trusts,
and officials doing business within the state; to prevent fictitious capitalization; and to
authorize civil and criminal proceedings in respect to all the wrongs herein declared against.

430

ARIZ. CONST. OF 1910, art. XIV, § 15.
OKLA. CONST., art. 5, § 44 (emphasis added).
432
Id.
433
WYO. CONST., art. 1, § 30.
431

that was nearly identical to the older provisions prohibiting state-granted monopolies during a
period when most state constitutional amendments were including provisions to prohibit private,
not state-granted, monopolies.
C.

The Application of Those Provisions

A survey of all of the case law regarding antimonopoly provisions in state constitutions
provides, not surprisingly, that states whose amendments were adopted at the Founding until the
1870s provide the strongest protections against state-granted monopolies. However, there were
two instances found where courts in states with Progressive-era provisions aimed at so-called
private monopolies indicated that these provisions might also be used to protect against state
granted monopolies. 434 Regardless, these provisions have proven to be an important method for
the protection of economic rights. State courts have recognized the English roots from which the
concern about monopolies arose. For example, as the Arkansas Supreme Court pointed out:
The monopolies which in England became so odious as to excite general
opposition, and infuse a detestation which has been transmitted to the free States
of America, were in the nature of exclusive privileges of trade, granted to
favorites or purchasers from the crown, for the enrichment of individuals, at the
cost of the public. They were supported by no considerations of public good.
They enabled a few to oppress the community by undue charges for goods or
services. The memory, and historical traditions, of abuses resulting from this
practice, has left the impression that they are dangerous to Liberty, and it is this
kind of monopoly, against which the constitutional provision is directed. 435
This Section discusses four principle areas where statutes have been struck down under
antimonopoly provisions in state constitutions: (A) industry licensing requirements; (B) taxes
designed to benefit preferred industries; (C) monopolies to do business with the government
434
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itself; and (D) price controls designed to benefit insiders. These twentieth century cases suggest
that antimonopoly provisions—along with other economic liberty enhancing provisions such as
Lockean provisos, equal protection, due process, and privileges and immunities clauses—may be
useful for challenging preferential economic regulations today.

Despite their usefulness,

Subsection E explores potential reasons why most states have not adopted antimonopoly
provisions, since only eight states prohibit the grant of monopolies by the state in their states’
constitutions today and most modern antimonopoly provisions prohibit only so-called private
monopolies.
1.

Challenging Licensing Requirements

The first, and most promising, area for antimonopoly provisions to be used concerns the
prohibition of licensing requirements to work in a specific trade. A survey of the case law found
that antimonopoly provisions have been used to strike down licensing requirements in: building
hospitals, 436 providing ambulance services, 437 tile placing, 438 car dealerships, 439 photography, 440
dry cleaning, 441 gas stations (which was a victory for Standard Oil, no less), 442 and taxi cabs. 443
Important to the occupational licensing decisions is the level of skill that is required. If a
trade is a relatively easy trade to learn, the court is more likely to strike down an occupational
licensing law since this would be an impermissible extension of the state’s police power. For
example, in Roller v. Allen, where the Supreme Court of North Carolina struck down a licensing
regulation for those in the tile placing industry, the court emphasized that the trade is “simple,
436
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easy to learn, and requires no special skill” and thus there was an absence of a public interest in
regulating the trade. 444
Because professions such as law and medicine tend to require much more specialized
skill and training than other occupations (like placing tile, photography, and dry cleaning), the
imposition of licensing requirements in these industries can be justified as valid exercises of the
state’s police power. The primary problem with licensing requirements which have been struck
down under state anti-monopoly clauses is that there was little to no concern in those cases about
public health and safety considerations that might justify occupational licensing. Rather, the
impetus for imposing occupational licensing requirements in those cases was entirely to promote
special interests—an interest of photographers and dry cleaners already working in the industry
to limit the entry of others in order to stifle competition to maximize their rents.
By contrast, in areas such as law and medicine, generally considerable skill and training
are required in order to practice in the industry. If someone is holding themselves out to be a
doctor, but does not actually have the qualifications normally expected of a doctor, the
consequences could very well be tragic. However, there is little harm that can be done to
another’s health if a photographer is not specially trained under the requirements set up to obtain
a license to be a photographer. It is undoubtedly true that lawyers and doctors do encourage
limitations on the granting of licenses in order to limit the number of entrants into their
respective industries. However, the primary social motivation for licensing requirements in
highly skilled industries is not to cap the number of people in the industry, but rather to protect
the public from the potential negative consequences of receiving services which require unusual
expertise from an unlicensed—and thus likely untrained—medical or legal professional.
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This is not to say that licensing requirements for more highly trained professions, such as
engineering, medicine, and law, are absolutely necessary. Given the self-regulation of many
industries, including the aforementioned industries themselves, there is good reason to believe
that self-regulation (and even self-imposed licensing requirements) would guard against many of
the health and safety concerns that give rise to legally mandated licensing requirements by the
state. However, since the primary justification for licensing requirements in more highly skilled
professions is health and safety concerns—not the protection of special interests—occupational
licensure is more easily justifiable in those professions.
An important consideration for courts is who controls the distribution of licenses. If a
state licensing board is controlled by those who already work in the industry, the statute
requiring occupational licensing is unlikely to be upheld. This is obviously because the board is
more likely to promote a monopoly when the distribution of licenses is controlled by people who
are already working in the industry.

This rational is the same as the rational used in Dr.

Bonham’s Case, the seventeenth century English case famous for Sir Edward Coke’s holding
that the common law controlled acts of Parliament. In Dr. Bonham’s Case, the court struck
down a patent granted by King Henry VIII, later confirmed by statute, which gave the Royal
College of Physicians the power to impose fines on physicians who had not been licensed by the
College to practice medicine there. 445 The fact that Royal College of Physicians received half of
all fines meant that the doctors were “not only judges but also actual parties to any cause of
action before them,” and this was a key part of the reason Sir Edward Coke gave for striking
down the law. 446
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members of the occupational licensing board came from the tile placing industry itself. 447 This
was also an important consideration in State v. Harris, in which the Supreme Court of North
Carolina struck down a law creating a “State Cleaners Commission.” 448 Noting that such boards
are the equivalent of private trade guilds, the court suggested that the boards were even more
damaging to the public once sanctioned by the state since they had the force of the criminal
courts behind them. 449
Historically, North Carolina has had the most successful challenges in the licensing area.
Perhaps not surprisingly, North Carolina was one of the two states which had an antimonopoly
provision in its state constitution since the founding. 450 However, recent case law in North
Carolina suggests that its antimonopoly provision may not provide as strong protection today as
was formerly the case. In American Motors Sales v. Peters in 1984, North Carolina’s Supreme
Court held that a statute which made it unlawful for a car manufacturer to grant a franchise in
what the state determined to be a trade area that was already sufficiently served by a dealer or
dealers did not violate the state’s antimonopoly clause even though there was only one dealer in
the area. 451 The court distinguished the case from an almost identical law that was struck down
in Georgia on the grounds that Georgia’s constitution (at the time) also prohibited laws that
lessen competition, while the North Carolina constitution only prohibits monopolies.452
However, this recent holding is difficult to reconcile with other cases in North Carolina, since the
laws in the other cases (Roller v. Allen and State v. Harris) also tended to lessen competition but
did not create outright monopolies.
447
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Another consideration calling into question the effectiveness of antimonopoly provisions
today is that many of these cases were brought forty or more years ago, and thus it is unclear
how courts would treat challenges under these clauses today. Challenges are still being brought
under state antimonopoly provisions to strike down occupational licensing laws today. For
example, there were two recent cases challenging licensing requirements under antimonopoly
provisions, among other claims, in Maryland in 2009 and in Texas in 2010. However, both
regulations were struck down on other grounds. In Texas, the trial court struck down a law
which prohibited non-dentists from “floating” (grinding down) horses’ teeth. 453

The court

ultimately found that it violated Texas administrative law rulemaking procedures. 454

In

Maryland, the trial court granted summary judgment to an owner of a horse massage business
(who worked in the industry for more than thirty years) when the Board of Chiropractic
Examiners sought to ban her from the trade. 455 The court held that Maryland’s Board of
Chiropractic Examiners had no authority to regulate the horse massage industry. 456
2.

Striking Down Taxes that Benefit Preferred Industries

Another area in which state constitutional antimonopoly clauses have been used is in
challenging the validity of laws that impose taxes on some parties in order to benefit others. For
example, in Appeal of Arcadia Dairy Farms, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina struck
down a statute which provided tax and equalization payments to North Carolina milk producers
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as invalid under the state constitution’s antimonopoly clause. 457 In discussing the lack of a
public purpose for the statute, the court pointed out that the statute’s entire goal was to require
dairy producers to pay competitors—not to improve the quality of milk for consumers. 458
However, as an example of the application of a Progressive era antimonopoly provision,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota refused to strike down a law which taxed margarine but not
butter. 459 While the court acknowledged that if the funds received went directly to the butter
industry the law would have contravened the antimonopoly provision, since the funds went to a
general pool, the court held that the law was constitutional. 460
Nevertheless, with the application of a bit of economic theory, it is easy to see that the
distinction drawn by the South Dakota Supreme Court should not really have mattered. To the
extent margarine is a substitute for butter (which in many cases it is), a tax on margarine will
raise its cost to consumers. Thus, on the margin, consumers will switch to other substitutes, such
as butter. This will tend to encourage a monopoly for the butter industry because consumers will
be encouraged by an increase in the price of margarine to switch to consuming butter instead. Of
course, the economic effects would likely not be as drastic as if the taxes charged to the
margarine industry were directly used to pay the butter industry. However, the law’s tendency to
create monopoly would still remain and the motivation for the law in this case was undoubtedly
to benefit the butter industry at the expense of its main competitor.
3.

Challenging Monopolies for Doing Business with the Government

Both Maryland and Arkansas’s provisions have been used to strike down laws which give
private parties a monopoly for doing business with the government.
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Like Maryland’s

constitution, Arkansas’s constitution provides the traditional language: “. . . monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be allowed.” 461
For example, in Raney v. County Commissioners of Montgomery County, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland (the state’s highest court) struck down a law in 1936 which granted a
monopoly for public notices in newspapers. 462

Importantly, when discussing Maryland’s

antimonopoly provisions, the court emphasized that because Maryland’s constitution otherwise
did not denounce special privileges, it was necessary to understand the antimonopoly language
broadly so as to “safeguard the citizen in the enjoyment of privileges and immunities which were
regarded as of common right.” 463
The antimonopoly provision was similarly relied on in Alphin v. Henson. 464 The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland dealt with the issue of whether the city could
grant the power to one individual to conduct all negotiations at a municipal regional airport
under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. 465 In granting an injunction, the court relied on
Raney, noting that Maryland’s constitutional prohibition on monopolies weighed in favor of its
decision. 466 In Upchurch v. Adelsberger, the Supreme Court of Arkansas also struck down a city
ordinance which required that materials printed for the city bear a specific labor union’s label—
thus giving all of its printing work to one labor union—under the state’s antimonopoly
provision. 467
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Although antimonopoly provisions may be used to strike down monopolies to do
business with local governments, it is generally permissible for local governments to enter
contracts with private parties which give those parties the exclusive right to provide public
services, such as utilities like water, gas, and electricity. 468 This may be defended on the grounds
that these kinds of public services are considered “natural monopolies.” That is, where capital
costs are especially high in a particular industry, there are especially high barriers to entry. Thus,
there are large economies of scale, so it is optimal to only have one supplier in the industry.
The existence of natural monopolies has been challenged by some free-market
economists, 469 suggesting that the need for grants of monopoly for public utilities is
unwarranted. However, the justification for granting these kinds of monopolies appears to be
based on an economic rationale rather than as a result of the desire to protect special interests.
Thus, the rationale for striking down laws under antimonopoly provisions (to guard against states
granting privileges in order to protect special interests) does not appear to be implicated when
local governments grant monopolies for public utilities.
4.

Combating Price Controls

The Supreme Court’s decisions in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 470 upholding the
constitutionality of a minimum wage law, and Nebbia v. People of New York, 471 upholding the
constitutionality of a state board which fixed the price of milk, enabled states to justify their own
minimum wage and fee laws. 472 However, two states with antimonopoly provisions were faced
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with the question of whether these regulations were constitutional under their state constitutions’
antimonopoly provisions.
In 1957 in Arnold v. Board of Barbers, the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the
validity of a statute which established a “Board of Barbers” and set minimum price requirements
for paying barbers. 473

In noting that great deference must be given to the legislature in

determining whether the law serves a public purpose, the court held that requiring minimum
prices for barber services is related to the sanitary conditions of barber shops and thus was not
unconstitutional. 474 Interestingly, however (since this was a Progressive-era provision) the court
acknowledged that the antimonopoly provision in its state constitution “enjoins upon the
legislature a policy opposed to trusts, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.”475
Thus, New Mexico’s antimonopoly clause may be interpreted broadly to prohibit state-granted
monopolies. Nonetheless, the court failed to find that the statutes tended to confer monopoly
rents, although members of the board came “exclusively from those engaged in the profession or
business of barbering.” 476
However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in 1942, relying on a more traditional
antimonopoly provision adopted at a time when such provisions were aimed at state grants of
monopoly, in Noble v. Davis struck down a nearly identical statute to the New Mexico statute,
which established minimum prices for barbers which were determined by the State Board of
Barber Examiners. 477 The plaintiff charged twenty-five cents for a haircut while the Board
mandated a fee of at least forty cents. 478 Looking at the long history of the barber industry,
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dating back to the time of the Romans, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the profession
was one historically of common right—echoing Sir Edward Coke—and thus could not be
regulated except as required under the police power of the state. 479 The Court held that where
the Board only regulated with respect to economic issues—such as minimum prices and opening
hours—such regulations could not be upheld as serving the public purpose under the state’s
police power. 480
The use of an antimonopoly provision to strike down a law that merely imposes price
requirements requires an expansive view of the clause’s language and history. The historical
concern with state-granted monopolies suggests that state constitutional antimonopoly clauses
were primarily intended to prohibit outright prohibitions on entering an industry rather than
indirect barriers to entering an industry, such as minimum price requirements. The Board of
Barbers may have recognized that strict licensing requirements would have been easily struck
down under the Arkansas Constitution’s ban on monopolies, and thus it might have sought to
circumvent that constitutional prohibition through an indirect barrier to entry. The Board of
Barbers was also undoubtedly helped by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in West Coast Hotel,
which upheld a minimum wage law and overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital. However, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas court correctly saw the intended consequences of the minimum
pricing law—to indirectly establish barriers to enter the barber industry for no other reason than
to protect the interests of barbers already working in the industry.
D.

Why Have So Few States Adopted Antimonopoly Provisions?

Many states have adopted antimonopoly provisions and similar prohibitions on exclusive
privileges. The Case of Monopolies and Statute of Monopolies were very important in English
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legal history and the consequences which flowed from allowing state-granted monopolies were
especially feared by the English people. Those concerns carried over to America, as is shown by
a number of statements from the Founders and from the Antifederalists. Thus, it is perhaps
surprising that so few states have adopted explicit antimonopoly clauses in their state
constitutions today.
A potential explanation is that many states probably did not feel compelled to adopt
antimonopoly clauses because their constitutions already included provisions which protected
economic liberty in other ways and which dealt with many of the same concerns the
antimonopoly clauses were intended to protect against.

Other provisions that tend to be

important for and to protect economic liberty include: 1) privileges and immunities clauses, 2)
due process clauses, 3) takings clauses, 4) Lockean provisos (which are broad guarantees of
inalienable, natural, or inherent rights 481), 5) free speech clauses, and 6) equal protection clauses.
The addition of an antimonopoly clauses alongside, for example, the protection of an
individual’s privileges and immunities, may appear superfluous.

For instance, in State v.

Ballance, the Supreme Court of North Carolina struck down a law requiring licenses for
photographers under the due process clause and the state constitution’s Lockean proviso as well
as the antimonopoly provision. 482 Another example is the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision
in Raney. In that case, the Court found persuasive the fact that Maryland’s constitution, unlike
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the constitutions of other states, contained no other clauses except for the antimonopoly clause
which would protect against the granting of special privileges. 483 Thus, a desire for simplicity
and brevity might cause a state constitution’s drafter to see little reason to add an antimonopoly
provision to its constitution when other provisions already protect similar bundles of rights.
Another probable reason as to why not all states have constitutional antimonopoly clauses
is that since the New Deal concern with protecting economic liberty has greatly diminished. As
a result of the New Deal, economic liberties are subjected to what some have called
“toothless” 484 rational basis review. Courts are now extremely reluctant to strike down economic
regulations and legislatures are especially eager to impose economic regulations at the state
level. Moreover, the fact that there was a shift in the Progressive Era to prevent privately created
monopolies instead of state-granted monopolies in state constitutions also reflects a change in
popular views about where power should be concentrated. Perhaps this is also a reflection of
public sentiment (or complacency) in the area of protecting economic liberty.
As was discussed above, although several states have provisions that ban state-created
monopolies in their constitutions today, these clauses have often not regularly been used and
state courts have become increasingly less likely to strike down laws under these clauses. As the
recent challenges in Maryland (involving horse massage) and Texas (involving horse teeth
grinding) illustrate, courts may be more likely to strike down such laws on other grounds. That
is, it is perhaps easier—and less controversial—to strike down laws as violations of
administrative rulemaking requirements than as violations of the more expansive prohibition on
state granted monopolies, which would in turn call into question the validity of many other
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economic regulations. Thus, although state constitutions are amended much more frequently
than is the federal constitution, it is unlikely that an antimonopoly provision would be a priority
for drafters of modern state constitutions.
CONCLUSION
While the evils of state granted monopolies in England did not lead to an antimonopoly
provision in the federal constitution, there is ample evidence that the right to be free from
government monopolies is deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradition. The English fear
of monopolies was a fear that Americans experienced under colonial rule, and it provided one of
many justifications put forward for American independence. The Antifederalists spoke out
against monopolies, and Federalists such as James Madison discussed the issue with Thomas
Jefferson and George Mason during the debates on the Constitution. During the ratification of
the federal Constitution, six states even requested the inclusion of an antimonopoly clause as an
amendment to the Constitution. In addition, Congress is only given enumerated power to create
monopolies in the Patent and copyright context, which implies that Congress lacks such power in
other contexts. Moreove, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV may very well have
recognized a constitutional right to be free from partial or discriminatory laws. Two states had
antimonopoly provisions in their constitutions at the time of the founding, and many more states
added antimonopoly provisions to their constitutions during the nineteenth century due to the
Jacksonian concern about monopolies. This thread of Jacksonian thought was adopted by the
Abolitionists and then by Reconstruction era Republicans who argued that the institution of
slavery was itself a particularly perverse monopoly. The antimonopoly argument thus played an
important role in the writing of the Fourteenth Amendment, which for the Radical Republicans
was a ban on all systems of class-based legislation, of exclusive privileges, and of monopolies.

All of this evidence—from Seventeenth Century England, from the colonial period, from the
experience in the states, and from the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment—makes it clear that
there is a strong antimonopoly tradition in U.S. constitutional law.
The fact that in recent times the federal courts have, for the most part, relegated cases
involving economic regulations to limited “rational basis” review, however, has meant that until
recently challenges to laws on antimonopoly grounds were unlikely to be successful. This may
change now that the rational basis test has been employed to strike down classifications on the
basis of sex, sexual orientation, and mental retardation, and now that the Takings Clause is
experiencing a revival at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite the post New Deal
rational basis mindset, this article has shown that state antimonopoly clauses in particular have
proven to be important for striking down a number of economic regulations that grant special
privileges to some at the expense of others—licensing requirements, taxes designed to benefit
preferred industries, monopolies to do business with the government, and price controls designed
to benefit insiders. Antimonopoly clauses can also be used to strike down laws such as licensing
requirements where the court finds that the laws grant special privilege absent any health and
safety concerns. Challenges to state laws on antimonopoly grounds have been made recently,
such as with a law governing Maryland horse massages and with the Texas horse floating cases
discussed in Section III.
The right to compete, and more fundamentally, the right to earn an honest living, is a
basic right embodied in U.S. constitutional law. There is substantial evidence, from the English
and colonial history, from debates on the federal constitution and its ratification, from the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from state constitutional law, to show that this is the case.
However, the longstanding use of rational basis review has meant that the courts have too often

surrendered to a legislative process that is dominated by well-entrenched interest groups seeking
monopoly rents from the state. It means that fundamental economic liberties too often go
unprotected by the courts. In short, the use of rational basis review has meant that “property is at
the mercy of the pillagers.” 485 As this article has shown, however, “the constitutional guarantee
of liberty deserves more respect—a lot more.” 486
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